THE PARTIAL-CLOSING CONUNDRUM: THE
DUTY OF EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS
TO BARGAIN IN GOOD FAITH
TIMOTHY
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Since 1935 collective bargaining has been the cornerstone of industrial relations for millions of American workers.' The purpose of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 is to eliminate industrial
strife between companies and unions through labor negotiations. 3 The
Wagner Act 4 requires employers to bargain with the majority representative of their employees; 5 the Taft-Hartley Amendments 6 place a correlative bargaining obligatioif upon unions. 7 Congress has defined the
duty to bargain as "the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
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1. As of 1978, union membership for non-agricultural employees totalled 20.2 million and
was approximately 23.6% of the entire non-agricultural work force. GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA), No. 827, at 35 (Sept. 10, 1979). The exact percentage of workers covered by collective
bargaining agreements is unknown. In 1974 labor contracts negotiated by unions and employee
associations in the United States and Canada covered 24.7 million employees. U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1937, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATIONS 79 n.2 (1975).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
3. Section 1 of the Act provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.

29 U.S.C.

§ 151 (1976).

4. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
5. Section 8(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-... (5)
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions
of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
6. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171187 (1976)).
7. Section 8(b)(3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents-. . . (3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the represen...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3)
tative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 159(a).
(1976).
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The success of collective bargaining in improving employees'
working conditions and in peacefully resolving disputes between management and labor is reflected in the increasing number of items over
which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts
have required parties to negotiate. 9 Today employers and unions are

required to bargain over such diverse matters as compensation, 10 sever13
ance pay," pension and other welfare plans, 12 profit-sharing plans,
16
15
4
stock purchase plans,' company housing, meals and discounts,
grievance and arbitration procedures,'

7

layoffs and recalls,' 8 dis-

8. Section 8(d), id § 158(d).
9. Bargaining issues are classified as mandatory, permissive, or illegal subjects of bargaining. R. GoRmAN, LABOR LAW 496-531 (1976); C. MORRIS, Tim DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 389439 (1971). Mandatory items of bargaining fall within the terms "wages, hours. . . and conditions of employment" under section 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976); parties must negotiate over
such issues in good faith to impasse under section 8(a)(5), id § 158 (a)(5), and section 8(b)(3), id
§ 158(b)(3). The parties may propose permissive subjects of bargaining but cannot lawfully insist
upon them as a condition to a collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Industrial Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615
(3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964). Issues are illegal subjects of bargaining if inclusion of the items in a labor contract would be unlawful or inconsistent with the policies of the
NLRA. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (declaring invalid a contract clause
discriminating between white and black workers). See generally Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in GoodFaith, 47 VA. L. REV. 988 (1961); Murphy, Impasse and the Duty to Bargainin Good
Faith, 39 U. PITr. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Application of the Mandatory-PermissiveDichotomy to
the Duty to Bargain and UnilateralActiorn .4 Review and Reevaluation, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV.
918 (1974).
10. See, e.g., C & S Indus., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966) (piece rates and incentive plans); Smith
Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1964) (shift differentials).
11. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated, 379 U.S. 644
(1965), on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Carpenter Sprinkler Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 99 L.R.R.M. 1356 (1978),
enforced, 605 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979) (substitution of the employer's pension, health, and welfare
benefits for those provided under an expired contract); Keystone Consol. Indus., 237 N.L.R.B. 763
(1978), enforced, 606 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1979) (change in the administrator-processor of the employer's hospital, medical, and surgical insurance plan in the labor contract); Inland Steel Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948) (pension benefits), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960
(1949).
13. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 985 (1978); Dickten & Masch Mfg. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 112 (1960).
14. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Texas, Inc. (Foodway), 234 N.L.R.B. 72 (1978); B.F. Goodrich Co.,
195 N.L.R.B. 914 (1972).
15. See, eg., NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 205 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1953); Elgin
Standard Brick Mfg. Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1467 (1950).
16. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); NLRB v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv.
Co., 324 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1963); Chemtronics, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 178 (1978).
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943); NLRB v.
Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1941); Peerless Food Products, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 161
(1978).
18. See, e.g., Awrey Bakeries, Inc. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1976); Master Slack
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charge, 19 work loads, 20 work rules, 2 1 work assignments,
23

clauses, 24

22

compulsory

25
safety,
26

and contractual
no-strike
retirement policies,
clauses concerning race and sex discrimination.
Despite these many areas of agreement, the NLRB and the courts
continue to differ over whether structural changes in an employer's
business, such as relocations, liquidations of certain lines of business,
and partial closings, should be mandatory subjects of bargaining. 27 For
the most part, the NLRB has taken an approach opposite to that of the
majority of appellate courts over the duty to negotiate in partial-closing
situations. Whereas the Board requires an employer to notify and to
bargain with a union over both the decision and effects of a partial
closing, 28 the appellate courts have held that the duty exists only with
regard to the effects of the closing and that the decision to close is an
inherent management prerogative. 29 The conflict is particularly disCorp., 230 N.L.R.B. 1054 (1977), enforced, 618 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1980).
19. See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940); NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d
574 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 647 (1941).
20. See, e.g., Irvinton Motors, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 565, enforced, 343 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1965);
Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1286 (1964), enforced, 341 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1965).
21. See NLRB v. Southern Transp., Inc., 343 F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1965); Tower Hosiery Mills,
Inc., 81 N.L.R.B. 658 (1949), enforced, 180 F.2d 701 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950);
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161
F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
22. See Kendall College, 228 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1977), enforced, 570 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1978).
23. See Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1,enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 960 (1949).
24. See Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
25. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964); J.P. Stevens &
Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 738 (1978), enforced, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980).
26. See Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 742 (1976); Jubilee Mfg. Co.,
202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), af'd, 87 L.R.R.M. 3168 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
27. C. MORRIS, supra note 9, at 418-22; Bliss, Labor'rPlant Closure Pains, 24 Sw. L.J. 259
(1970); Fastiff, Changes in Business Operations: The Effects of the NLRA and Contract Language
on Employer Authority, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 281 (1974); Goetz, The Duty to BargainAbout
Changes in Operations, 1964 DUKE L.J. 1; Rabin, Fibreboard andthe Termination of Bargaining
Unit Work The Searchfor Standardsin Defning the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 803 (1971); Schwarz, PlantRelocation or PartialTermination-TheDuty to Decision-Bargain,
39 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1970); Swift, PlantRelocation: Catching Up With the Runaway Shop, 14
B.C. IND. & COM. REV. 1135 (1973).

28. See text accompanying notes 70-72 & 96 infra.
29. See text accompanying notes 59-69 & 74 infra. "Effects" bargaining usually involves
rights of employees that arise as a result of a closing, such as severance pay, pensions, other
accrued benefits, seniority, dates for unemployment eligibility, pending grievances, and possible
reemployment in other parts of an employer's enterprise. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB,
533 F.2d 1030, 1039 (8th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196
(3d Cir. 1965). See also Morrison Cafeterias Consol. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970);
NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406
F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
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turbing in view of the number of structural business changes in recent
years. 30 As more companies acquire, merge with, and liquidate business enterprises, and as recessions force many companies to close oper-

ations and lay off employees, the question of the duty to bargain over
these actions becomes increasingly important.

Not only have the Board and the courts differed in the past over
the duty to bargain, but also they are presently shifting their positions.
The Board seems to be requiring less bargaining over closing deci-

32
sions, 31 while some courts recently have required more bargaining.
The resulting uncertainty is not just a matter of scholarly concern. Employees and unions have little idea whether they will be consulted

before jobs are lost and livelihoods disrupted. Similarly, employers
who guess wrong, and fail to bargain when they should have, face severe penalties.3 3 The Supreme court will soon have the opportunity to
resolve these uncertainties in
.34

This article first reviews the pertinent Board and court decisions

concerning business liquidations. It points out the differences between
As the Board has noted, it is often difficult to distinguish clearly issues appropriate for "decision"
as opposed to "effects" bargaining in a partial-closing case. See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B.
561, 570 (1966). For example, the amount of severance pay and accrued benefits due upon closing, or the timing and implementation of a closing, might not only have an effect on the employees, but might also influence the decision itself.
30. There were a great number of mergers, acquisitions, and business terminations in the
mid-1970s:
YEAR

1974
1975
1976
1977

.................
.................
.................
.................

NUMBER OF MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS

NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL
AND COMMERCIAL FAILURES

1,460
1,048
1,081
1,182

9,915
11,432
9,628
7,919

L. LEVITON, FTC STATISTICAL REPORT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 10 (1977); BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1979, at 574, 576.
31. See notes 98-101 & 105-19
and accompanying text.
32. See notes 120-24 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 91-95 infra and accompanying text.
34. 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80544). In
the company, which provided cleaning services to various
nursing homes, discontinued service to one home and dismissed the workers employed there without notifying the union that represented these employees. The Second Circuit affirmed the
Board's finding that this action violated section 8(a)(5). The court applied the rebuttable-presumption analysis of Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), but unlike
the Third Circuit, the court focused not on the interests of the parties but on the statutory purposes
of the NLRA in imposing bargaining obligations. Because bargaining could have influenced the
closing decision and because the company failed to show futility or dire financial emergency, the
court found a violation.
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the Board and the courts regarding when the duty to bargain over a

decision to terminate part of a business enterprise arises, what the nature and extent of the duty are, and what the remedies for a failure to

bargain properly are. The article then criticizes the approaches taken
by the Board and the courts in these partial shutdown cases. Finally,
the article suggests an alternative analysis for determining when the

duty to bargain should arise in a partial closing.
I.

COURT AND BOARD DECISIONS

The dichotomy between the approaches of the NLRB and the
courts of appeals can be traced to two Supreme Court decisions:
FibreboardPaperProductsCorp. v. NLRB, 35 decided in 1964, and Textile Workers Union v. DarlingtonManufacturingCo. ,36 decided in 1965.

In Fibreboard, during the renegotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement between the company and the union that represented main-

tenance employees at the company's plant, management announced
that it had decided to subcontract out all the work then being performed by the maintenance employees. There was no proof that the

company was motivated by anti-union sentiment; it simply wanted to
save costs and to increase efficiency. The company hired an independ-

ent contractor to perform the work on a cost-plus basis, and the contractor used the same equipment and supervisors, and performed the
same work in the plant, as had the former employees. The Board concluded,37 on the basis of its decision in Town & Country Manufacturing
Co. ,38 that the employer's failure to negotiate with the union over its
35. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
36. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
37. 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 551 (1962) enforced sub nom. Machinists Local 1304 v. NLRB, 322
F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), afd 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
38. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). Initially the Board had
held that there is no duty to bargain over an employer's decision to subcontract work. See, e.g.,
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961). The Board reversed this policy in the
Town & Country case, 136 N.L.R.B. at 1027-28, relying primarily on Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). The Telegraphers case arose under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1976), which contains bargaining provisions similar to
the NLRA. In that case the union threatened to strike over the employer's refusal to bargain
about a proposed contractual amendment requiring union consent before the railroad could eliminate any employee positions or close any railroad stations. The employers sought an injunction in
federal court prohibiting such a strike. The Supreme Court held that no injunction could issue
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976), because a "labor dispute" was
involved concerning a "condition of employment." 362 U.S. at 335. The Court also noted that the
possible elimination of jobs could be the subject of bargaining under the Railway Labor Act
because a loss of jobs is a "working condition" over which employers were required to bargain.
Id at 336. In Town & Country the Board held that because the NLRA requires similar bargaining
over the terms and conditions of employment, the decision to eliminate jobs through subcontracting was a subject over which employers were required to bargain. 136 N.L.R.B. at 1026. Some
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decision to subcontract out the work violated its duty to bargain under
39
section 8(a)(5).
The Supreme Court agreed with the Board in a decision authored
by Chief Justice Warren. The opinion contained both expansive language, which the Board would later use in the partial-closing cases,
and more limited statements, which appellate courts would seize upon
to narrow and distinguish the case. First, the Fibreboardopinion noted
that the subcontracting in the case caused the termination of jobs of
bargaining-unit employees. The Court believed that employee dismissals plainly fell within the language of section 8(d) 40 as a "condition of
employment" over which an employer is required to bargain.41 The
Court then concluded that requiring an employer to bargain would
promote the central goals of the NLRA, underscoring this conclusion
with a finding that many collective bargaining agreements contained
clauses concerning subcontracting and that the reasons for
Fibreboard's subcontracting-to reduce costs attributable to wages,
fringe benefits, and excessive overtime-involved items usually resolved in collective bargaining.
Yet the Chief Justice noted several times that the Court's opinion
42
was limited to "the facts of this case":
The facts of the present case illustrate the propriety of submitting the
dispute to collective negotiation. The Company's decision to contract out the maintenance work did not alter the Company's basic
operation. The maintenance work still had to be performed in the
plant. No capital investment was contemplated; the Company
merely replaced existing employees with those of an independent
contractor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment. Therefore, to require the employer to bargain about the matter would43 not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the
business.
The Court then affirmed the Board's remedy that the employer resume
the maintenance operation, reinstate the employees with back pay from
the date of the Board's decision, and fulfill its statutory duty to bargain.
courts and commentators have distinguished Telegraphers on the basis that the Railway Labor

Act restricts management's rights more than the NLRA and that Telegraphers is inconsistent with
prior and subsequent NLRR and appellate court decisions. See NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322
F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963), vacated, 379 U.S. 644 (1965), on remand, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); Goetz, supra note 27, at 10-14.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See note 5 supra.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
41. 379 U.S. at 209-10. The Court also cited Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), for the proposition that loss of employment as a result of contracting out
work is a "condition of employment" under section 8(d) of the NLRA. See note 38 supra.
42. 379 U.S. at 209, 214-15.
43. Id at 213.
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44
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart narrowed the holding.
He emphasized that the case involved a mere "substitution of one
group of workers for another." 45 Other types of subcontracting practices or investment decisions would not be subject to the duty to bargain. 46 Although Justice Stewart agreed that job losses caused by
technological change or other management investment decisions could
have a "cruel impact upon the lives and fortunes of the working men
and women of the Nation," he asserted that, in the absence of specific
congressional authorization to the contrary, such decisions were strictly
management prerogatives. 47
Thus, although Fibreboardestablished the principle that the duty
to bargain attaches to certain management decisions about operational
changes, the decision's scope was far from clear. The Court acknowledged the interest of employees in having some input prior to a decision resulting in the termination of jobs, but realized that it was
treading close to the heart of management prerogatives. The majority
opinion cautioned that the law in this area should be developed on a
48
case-by-case basis.

One year after Fibreboard the Supreme Court decided Textile
Workers Union v. DarlingtonManufacturing Co. 49 The case involved
the Deering-Milliken textile enterprise and the unionization of one of
its plants, the Darlington Manufacturing Company. The Textile
Workers Union won a representation election at the South Carolina
plant and asked the company to bargain. On the very day of the
union's request the company's board of directors voted to close the
plant. Shortly thereafter the company fired all employees at the plant
and sold the machinery and equipment. The NLRB found that the
closing was motivated by the anti-union feelings of Roger Milliken, the
president of Darlington, and was thus unlawful.5 0 Although the
Supreme Court decided the case under section 8(a)(3), 5 1 which prohib44. Id at 217 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. Id at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring).
46. Id at 225 (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. Id at 225-26 (Stewart, J., concurring). For a very different view of the duty to bargain
over the effects of technological change, see NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 100 S.
Ct. 2305, 2317 (1980) (there exists a "congressional preference for collective bargaining as the
method for resolving disputes over dislocations caused by the introduction of technological innovation in the workplace"). See also National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612
(1967); American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953).
48. 379 U.S. at 215.
49. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
50. 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), which provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an

employer- ...

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
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its an employer from encouraging or discouraging union membership
by discriminatory treatment of employees, rather than under section
on an employer's duty to
8(a)(5), the case has had a significant impact
52
operations.
of
closing
a
bargain before
The Court first held that an employer has an absolute right to close
its business completely--even if management chants anti-union mantras as it closes the doors.53 Just as an employee can withdraw from the
coverage of the NLRA by quitting his job, an employer can remove
itself from the coverage of the Act by ceasing to do business. The
Court reasoned that an employer, even if motivated by spite for the
union, can obtain no future business benefit by completely closing its
enterprise.54 But a partial closing, the Court found, is subject to section
8(a)(3), because an anti-union partial closing can bring the employer
future benefits by intimidating employees in the employer's other
55
plants.
The Darlingon Court then delineated specific rules for the Board
to follow before finding an unfair labor practice "[i]n an area which
'56
trenches so closely upon otherwise legitimate employer prerogatives.
To establish a violation of section 8(a)(3), the Board must find that the
employer had an interest or affiliation in another business, that the effect of the closing was to chill unionism in that other business, and that
the employer could reasonably foresee that the anti-union effects would
occur.57 The requirements of effect and foreseeability have not often
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
52. The Board had found that the company violated section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)

(1976), by dismissing the employees after the decision to close, and that it violated section 8(a)(5),
id. § 158(a)(5) by refusing to honor the union's request to bargain after the decision to liquidate.
The Court eliminated any consideration of sections 8(a)(1) and (5), however, by noting that the
propriety of the Board's conclusion about these violations turned on whether the decision to shut
down transgressed section 8(a)(3), id § 158(a)(3). 380 U.S. at 266-67 nn.5 & 6. According to the
Court, the Board should be "treating the closing only under § 8(a)(3)." id at 268-69.

53. 380 U.S. at 273-74.
54. Id at 269-74. In view of the Darlington decision, the Board has conceded that no duty
exists to bargain over a decision to close completely. See, e.g., Midland-Ross Corp., 239 N.L.R.B.
323, 329 (1978), enforced, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 210 (1980). The Board,
however, requires an employer to give notice and to bargain over the "effects" of a total shut
down. Hillcrest Furniture Mfg., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 105 L.R.R.M. 1393, 1394 (1980); Merryweather Optical Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1213 (1979); J-B Enterprises, 237 N.L.R.B. 383 (1978); Stagg
Zipper Corp., 222 N.L.R.B. 1249 (1976); Automation Inst. of L.A., Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 725 (1974);

Triplex Oil Refining Div. of Pentalic Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 500 (1971); Interstate Tool Co., 177
N.L.R.B. 686 (1969).

55. 380 U.S. at 274-76.
56. Id at 276.
57. The Court described the test as follows:

If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed for anti-union reasons
(1) have an interest in another business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the
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been met in subsequent cases.5 8 Moreover, the appellate courts have
seized upon the broad language in Darlington regarding an employer's
right to close its business, to determine whether an employer has a duty
to bargain in such situations.
In 1965, the same year that the Supreme Court decided Darlington, the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits found that
employers have no legal obligation under either Fibreboardor Darlington to bargain over partial closings or plant relocations. In NLRB v.
William J Burns InternationalDetective Agency, Inc. 59 the company
informed the union, shortly after the union was certified, that the company was discontinuing its guard operations in Omaha, Nebraska, to
avoid financial losses. Similarly, in NLRB v. Royal Plating& Polishing
Co. 60 the company decided, without bargaining with the union, to sell

one of its plants under a threat of condemnation proceeding by a local
government agency. And in NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc.6 1 the em-

ployer dairy decided, for economic reasons, to sell its products to independent distributors and to stop making deliveries itself. The dairy
then fired all employee drivers engaged in deliveries.
same line of commercial activity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality to give
promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement of unionization in that business; (2) act to close their plant with the purpose of producing such a result; and (3)
occupy a relationship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that
its employees will fear that such business will also be closed down if they persist in
organizational activities, we think that an unfair labor practice has been made out.
Id at 275-76. On remand the Board found that Milliken had the requisite illegal purpose and
found an improper effect of stifling union organization in his other businesses; Milliken had made
several speeches in South Carolina decrying unionism in the textile industry and had sent a memorandum to his other mills outlining his anti-union feelings and noting that those mills would also
be closed if the employees organized. Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1967), enforced,
397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969).
58. See, e.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consol., 177 N.L.R.B. 591 (1969), rev'd on other grounds,
431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970); Motor Repair, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 1082 (1968); A.C. Rochat Co., 163
N.L.R.B. 421 (1967). The Board has had difficulty determining violations under Darlington, at
least in part because the Supreme Court seemed to reject the application of a balancing test or the
"inherently destructive" test to determine a violation. See 380 U.S. at 269 n.10. See also NLRB v.
Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963);
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87 (1957). It is often impossible to
prove that an employer in closing one operation intended to affect union relations in another
operation. The effect of the injury occurs in the closed enterprise. Often employees in one part of
an operation are unaware of the employer's anti-union activities elsewhere. Few employers will,
like Roger Milliken, leave a trail of evidence establishing an intention to curtail union organization in other parts of an enterprise by closing a newly-organized unit. For a further discussion of
this problem see Oberer, The Scienter Factorin Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of
Balancing,HostileMotive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 491 (1967); Rabin, supra note 27, at
817-18.
59. 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
60. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
61. 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
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The appellate courts in all three cases relied upon the limiting language in the Fibreboardmajority opinion and the rationale of Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion to distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in that case. 62 In Burns the court noted that, unlike the employer in
Fibreboard,the company neither continued to perform nor subcontract
out the work.63 In Royal Plating the court found that the decision to
close one of the plants was a major investment decision resulting in a
substantial withdrawal of capital, rather than a mere substitution as in
Fibreboard64 And in Adams Dairy the court found that the employer
had made a basic operational change in its capital structure and not
simply a subcontracting arrangement. 65 The courts in all three cases
determined that requiring the employer to bargain over the decision
would significantly abridge the company's right to manage its business.
In effect, the appellate courts found the converse of Fibreboardto be
true: whenever there is not a mere substitution of employees but rather
a significant capital investment decision or a basic operational change,
the employer has no duty to bargain.
In addition to relying on Justice Stewart's analysis in Fibreboard,
the courts reasoned that nothing in the legislative history of the NLRA
suggests that partial-closing decisions should be considered mandatory
subjects of bargaining. 66 The courts also superimposed the Darlington
motive test 67 on Justice Stewart's analysis to determine whether an em-

ployer is required to bargain over its decision to partially terminate an
62. See 346 F.2d at 901-02; 350 F.2d at 196; 350 F.2d at 109-11. Most appellate courts have
treated Justice Stewart's concurring opinion as the rationale of the majority decision. Although
Chief Justice Warren limited the Fibreboardholding to the facts of the case, nowhere did he
suggest that different types of management decision, such as partial closings, would be free of all
bargaining duties. Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. L. REV. 133,
153-54 (1974).
63. 346 F.2d at 901.
64. 350 F.2d at 196.
65. 350 F.2d at 111.
66. 350 F.2d at 195; 350 F.2d at Ill. See also Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1277 (7th Cir.
1980) (Pell, J., dissenting in part); General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1971), enforced
sub nom. UAW Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The basis for this proposition
seems to be Justice Stewart's remark in his Fibreboardconcurrence about the concerns of technology and automation replacing employees:
It is possible that in meeting these problems Congress may eventually decide to give
organized labor or government a far heavier hand in controlling what until now have
been considered the prerogatives of private business management. That path would
mark a sharp departure from the traditional principles of a free enterprise economy.
Whether we would follow it is, within constitutional limitations, for Congress to choose.
But it is a path which Congress certainly did not choose when it enacted the Taft-Hartley
Act.
379 U.S. at 225-26 (Stewart, J., concurring).
67. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
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enterprise.6 8 Because the courts found that the terminations in these
cases were for economic, and not anti-union, reasons, they found no
obligation to bargain. In short, partial-closing decisions, unlike subcontracting, are at the "core of entrepreneurial controrl; 69 as long as
management's reason for such a decision is economic, there is no requirement of bargaining under section 8(a)(5).
Whereas the appellate courts have viewed the partial-closing decision from the perspective of management, the Board has looked primarily through the eyes of the employees. In 1966 the Board in Ozark
Trailers,Inc. 70 explicitly rejected the holdings of Royal Platingand Adams Dairy and found that the failure to bargain over the decision to
close one part of the company's operation violates section 8(a)(5) even
though the decision was for purely economic reasons. The Board
found that Darlington was inapposite because it dealt only with section
8(a)(3) of the Act, and that the holding of Fibreboardcontrolled the
duty-to-bargain issue.71 The Board noted that the decision to close,
like the decision to subcontract, is often based upon labor-related costs,
which are traditional subjects of collective bargaining. Requiring the
employer to bargain over the decision to close would not significantly
infringe management rights, because section 8(a)(5) does not require
the employer to obtain the agreement of the union before closing, but
only requires him to negotiate over the issue in good faith until an impasse is reached. 72 Moreover, according to the Board any infringement
of management rights is outweighed by the possible gains of keeping
the plant open and retaining jobs. The Board noted that a decision to
close has as great an effect on employees who lose their jobs as on employers who undertake a major operational change or investment decision. Requiring an employer to bargain over the decision to terminate
part of an operation would, the Board concluded, promote the indus73
trial harmony sought by the NLRA.
The Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth,
and District of Columbia Circuits joined the Third and Eighth Circuits
and rejected the Board's Ozark Trailers decision.74 Most of these
68. 346 F.2d at 902; 350 F.2d at 196; 350 F.2d at 112-13.
69. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring); UAW Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).

71. Id at 565-67.
72. Id at 568-69.
73. Id at 567.
74. See NLRB v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp., 541 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1976) (no opinion

published) (termination of portions of a trucking operation); Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533
F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976) (closing of one production plant and relocation of work); International
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courts have found that if an employer's decision to close was at the core
of entrepreneurial control and based upon economic, rather than antiunion, reasons, the employer may act unilaterally. Some commentators
have suggested that this view is based on the economy's need for a free
flow of capital unfettered by collective bargaining requirements. 75
A few appellate courts have offered additional rationales, emphasizing, for example, the confidentiality involved in operational changes.
In InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. NortheastAirlines, Inc.,76

the union claimed that the employer had failed to meet its duty to bargain when it entered into a merger agreement that caused the termina-

tion of a number of jobs. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
found that there was no obligation for the company to discuss the deci-

sion with the union, in part because doing so would reveal the company's plans. "[M]erger negotiations," noted the court, "require a

secrecy, flexibility and quickness antithetical to collective bargaining."77
Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845
(1972) (merger between two airlines); UAW Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(sale of company-owned retail outlets to independent dealers); Morrison Cafeterias Consol., v.
NLRB, 431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970) (shutdown of a cafeteria shortly after the union won an
election); NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970) (cessation of one enterprise);
NLRB v. Dixie Ohio Express Co., 409 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (steamlining an operation of loading and unloading merchandise, causing job terminations); NLRB v. Thompson
Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698"(I0th Cir. 1969) (one terminal closed after an election victory by the
union); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967) (relocation of operations because of customer demands); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961)
(transfer of a business from one plant to another). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
accepted the Board's position in Ozark Trailers. NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 361 F.2d 512 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1965).
The position of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is uncertain: the court enforced the
Board's decision in Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972), enforced, 474 F.2d 1352 (7th
Cir. 1973) (no opinion published), in which the Board found no duty to bargain over an employer's decision to close its tool manufacturing plant, because the effect of the decision was to
take the employer out of the tooling business. See notes 107-10 infra and accompanying text. In
the recent case of Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980), however, the court in a 2-1 panel
decision upheld a Board finding that an employer had a duty to negotiate over its determination to
change from a full service restaurant to a cafeteria, which change caused a number of employees
to lose their jobs. Recently the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have
also retreated from their earlier positions adverse to Ozark Trailers. See notes 120-24 infra and
accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Comment, "PartialTerminations"- A Choice Between BargainingEquality and
Economic Effciency, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (1967). See also Brockway Motor Trucks v.
NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 748-49 (3d Cir. 1978) (Rosenn, J., dissenting), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No.
23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980); Farmer, BargainingRequirements in Connection with Subcontracting, Plant Removal, Sale oBusiness, Merger and Consolidation, 14 LAB. L.J. 957, 960 (1963).
76. 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). See also General Motors Corp.
191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), enforcedsub not UAW Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
77. 473 F.2d at 557. See also 191 N.L.R.B. at 952.
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Other courts have stated that providing notice prior to closing a
plant could be detrimental to employee morale, productivity, and discipline because employees would have little incentive to continue to perform their duties. 78 As key employees left and production deteriorated,
a plant might have to be closed even sooner than planned. Additionally, the premature disclosure of an employer's poor financial condition, a typical cause of a company's decision to close, could threaten
business relations with customers and suppliers. 79 In short, a requirement of prior notice when an employer is considering closing could
itself damage the business and thus be contrary to the employees' best
interests.
Courts also have reasoned that in many situations any negotiation
with employees over a partial shutdown would be futile.80 The most
common reason for business terminations is the losses suffered by the
employer, many of which are caused by forces outside the control of
either the company or the union. Not only would bargaining in such
cases be fruitless, but also the employees and the union would have no
incentive to agree to the closing. The union's best strategy might be to
prolong negotiations to forestall the closing and keep the workers employed for the longest possible time regardless of the economic consequences to the company. To require an employer to bargain in such
circumstances would aggravate the company's financial problems. Finally, courts have pointed out that such bargaining is senseless because
employees or their representatives have little familiarity with the complex financial considerations which must go into a liquidation, merger,
or partial closing.81
Two unstated concerns seem to underlie appellate court decisions
that hold an employer should have no duty to bargain over a determination to close a plant. One is the problem of deciding when the duty
to bargain arises and for how long it continues.82 The other is the problem of choosing an appropriate remedy if an employer violates this
78. See, e.g., Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 749 (3d Cir. 1978) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980). See also Rabin, supra

note 62, at 155.
79. 582 F.2d at 748 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
80. See UAW Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also O'Connell, The
Implicadons of DecisionBargaining, 16TH ANN. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR LAW 99 (1963).
81. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549, 557 (Ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). See also General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1971),
enforced sub nonm. UAW Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Goetz, supra note 27,
at 10; Schwarz, supra note 27, at 95-96.
82. See, e.g., Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 748 (3d Cir. 1978) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
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bargaining obligation.8 3 The Board has held that an employer must

notify and negotiate with the union concerning a partial closing at a
time when such bargaining could have some effect on management's

decision. The Board has described this time as "the point of [management's] thinking seriously about" a closing, 84 or when there is still occasion for "meaningful discussion of the decision." 85 This vague
language could mean that a company must bargain when management
first considers a possible closing, or when it undertakes a study of the

feasibility of continuing a plant in operation, or just prior to a formal
approval of the termination. The Board's own inconsistencies have

compounded the problems of proper timing. In RoyalPlating& Polishing Co. 86 and in Royal Typewriter Co. ,87 for example, the Board found
that each company's notification to the involved union of the possible
termination approximately one week before the final closing was inadequate. Yet in Farm Crest Bakeries88 notice and bargaining two days

before the decision to close was found sufficient, and in GeneralMotors
Corp.8 9 notice to the employees after the sale of part of an enterprise
was held to be proper.
Additionally, if financial difficulties impel a decision to close an
operation, management may be reluctant to make any concessions to a
union's almost certain request for a delay or reversal of the decision,
especially if a speedy closing is important. In negotiations where management refuses to budge from its position, the Board may be tempted
to find that the company did not meet its bargaining obligations under
the NLRA, but rather engaged only in "surface bargaining." 90
83. See, e.g., NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 115 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966).
84. See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 569 (1966).
85. See Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1013 (1974), enforced, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th
Cir. 1976).
86. 148 N.L.R.B. 545, 555 (1964), enforcement denied,350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). The company on June 14, 1963, gave notice to the union of the sale of one of its plants to a government

housing authority. By the end of June the company had fired all its employees, and on July 10 it
sold its machinery and equipment at public auction.
87. 209 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1012-13 (1974), enforced, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976). On April 15,
1969, the company informed the union that it was considering permanently closing the plant;
bargaining began on that date. On April 23 the company announced its decision to close the plant
and move production work to another location.
88. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 195, 101 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1979).
89. 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 958-59 (1971). The company agreed to sell a trucking retail outlet to
an independent dealer on June 6, 1969. On June 9 it informed the employees of this sale and of
the termination of their jobs.
90. For definitions of "surface bargaining" see NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d
131 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 481-82 (1976). While
the Board cannot compel parties to agree, H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), the Board
can compel parties to bargain in good faith. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Surface bargaining occurs
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A finding of a refusal to bargain can have dire effects on a com-

pany. When the Board finds a violation of the duty to bargain, it typically orders bargaining over a resumption of the closed business,

coupled with some form of back pay award. 91 The Board has also, in
some cases, required an employer to place discharged workers on preferential hiring lists at other plants and to pay those workers' relocation
costs. 92 In a few instances the Board has even ordered the employer to
resume the discontinued operation, 93 as the Supreme Court did in

Fibreboard.These remedies can be extremely costly for a business that
had initially been closed because of economic difficulties. In addition

to the immediate losses such remedies may impose on an employer, the
when a party goes through the motions of negotiations without a good faith desire to reach an
agreement. To determine whether parties are involved in true negotiations or are engaged in mere
surface bargaining, the Board applies a "totality of circumstances" test. The Board will look at
such factors as the proposals, counter-proposals, and concessions made by parties to determine
their subjective states of mind; their statements and conduct at the bargaining table; the length of
the negotiations; the failure to designate a bargaining agent with sufficient authority; dilatory tactics with an inherent intent to reach impasse, or arbitrary scheduling of the day and time of bargaining meetings. See Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1974); Firch Baking
Co. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 732 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973).
91. The purpose of the remedy is to recreate the type of strength that the union would have
had if the company had initially met its obligation to bargain:
[A] bargaining order, alone, cannot serve as an adequate remedy for the unfair labor
practices committed. The Act requires more thanproforma bargaining, but proforma
bargaining is all that is likely to result unless the Union can now bargain under conditions essentially similar to those that would have obtained had Respondents bargained in
good faith at the time the Act required them to do so. If the union must bargain devoid
of all economic strength, we would perpetuate the situation created by Respondents'
unlawful conduct which precluded meaningful bargaining.
Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1015 (1974) (footnote omitted), enforced, 533 F.2d 1030
(8th Cir. 1976). See also NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1979);
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 101 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1979), enforced, 627
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-544); Midland-Ross Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 323 (1978), enforced, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
210 (1980).
92. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 101 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1979), enforced,
627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980) (preferential hiring at other facilities if operations are not resumed),
cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-544); Midland-Ross Corp., 239
N.L.R.B. 323 (1978), enforced, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1980) (establish a preferential hiring list and
offer to pay relocation expenses to other facilities if the plant is not reopened), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 210 (1980); Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974), enforced, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir.
1976) (if the plant is not reopened, establish a preferential hiring list at another facility that engages in similar operations as the closed plant and offer to pay moving and transportation costs).
But cf. NLRB v. W.R. Grace & Co., 571 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the Board's
remedy of requiring reinstatement if the employer reopens the facility, or of establishing a preferential hiring list, is improper).
93. Smith Mfg. Co., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 103 L.R.R.M. 1432 (1980); Soule Glass & Glazing
Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 102 L.R.R.M. 1693 (1979); Case, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 798 (1978). The
Board is hesitant, however, to use this approach. See, e.g., Capitol Chrysler-Plymouth, 242
N.L.R.B. No. 178, 101 L.R.R.M. 1374 (1979); Co-Ed Garment Co., 231 N.L.R.B. 848 (1978); P.B.
Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1325 (1976); Walter Pape, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 719 (1973).

86
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employer may also be forced to forego "opportunities to liquidate assets, sell or lease properties, or disengage from burdensome contracts."'94 The harsh effects of these remedies have undoubtedly made

courts hesitant to find that a violation of the duty to bargain occurred
95
in a closing situation.
Although the NLRB's basic policy that an employer must bargain
over partial closings has remained the same, 96 the Board has begun to

find exceptions to its per se approach. This retreat has undoubtedly
been influenced by appellate court reversals of Board decisions.9 7 In
1971 the Board, in General Motors Corp.,98 aligned itself with the
courts by refusing to require an employer to bargain over its decision to

sell a retail outlet to an independent dealer, even though the sale resulted in all of the prior employees' losing their jobs. What made the
Board's new stance even more surprising were the facts of the case: the
union, upon hearing rumors of a possible sale, had requested the company to bargain prior to any decision to sell, but the company flatly
refused.9 9 The Board majority first noted the number of court decisions that had rejected its approach in partial-closing cases. leo Without
citing Ozark Trailers, the Board then held that because the decision to

sell the enterprise was a matter "essentially financial and managerial in
nature. . . [lying] at the very core of entrepreneurial control," and because the decision would "require secrecy as well as the freedom to act

quickly and decisively," there was no legal obligation for the employer
to bargain.' 0 '
Three years later in Royal Typewriter 0 2 the Board returned to its
94. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 749 (3d Cir. 1978) (Rosenn, J., dissenting), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
95. See, eg., NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 115 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 1011 (1966).
96. See, e.g., ABC Trans-Nat'l Transp. Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 103 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1980);
National Family Opinion, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 102 L.R.R.M. 1641 (1979); Blake Constr.
Co., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 102 L.R.R.M. 1471 (1979); Caltrans Systems, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 90,
102 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1979). See also Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980); Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 731 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23,
104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
97. In General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), enforcedsub nom, UAW Local 864 v.
NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the majority opinion acknowledged that "the courts have
sustained the Board's position in subcontracting cases, but rejected Board decisions requiring bargaining over more elemental management decisions, such as plant closings and plant removals."
191 N.L.R.B. at 951 (footnotes omitted).
98. 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971), enforcedsub nonm UAW Local 864 v. NLRB 470 F.2d 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
99. 191 N.L.R.B. at 957-58.
100. See note 97 supra.
101. 191 N.L.R.B. at 952.
102. 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974), enforced, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976).
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original position in Ozark Trailers. The Board distinguished General
Motors on the grounds that it involved an economic decision to sell an
independent dealership, 0 3 whereas in Royal Typewriter the company
had decided to close one of its plants but to continue manufacturing
similar products at another facility in the United States. The Board
found that this partial shutdown and relocation of operations was a
mandatory subject of bargaining10 4 The two cases are difficult to reconcile: the effect on the employees in both situations was a loss of jobs;
bargaining might have convinced either employer to remain in business; and both cases involved substantial financial reallocations.
Recently the Board again retreated from Ozark Trailers. InBrockway Motor Trucks'0 5 a company decided, for economic reasons, to
close one of its plants that manufactured, sold, and serviced trucks.
The Board restated its basic position that in partial-closing cases an
employer's decision to close, made without bargaining, violates section
8(a)(5). The Board noted, however, that the company had not shown
that its decision involved such a "significant investment or withdrawal
of capital" that it "affect[ed] the scope and ultimate direction of the
enterprise."' 0 6 This reference could signal that the Board believes that
partial-closing decisions based upon substantial economic considerations lie in the sole discretion of management.

The Board has found a number of other reasons not to require
bargaining in various situations. When a company has terminated a

distinct line of its business, the Board has not compelled negotiations
103. 209 N.L.R.B. at 1012.
104. Id.
105. 230 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1977), enforcement denied withoutprejudiceto commencement of additionalproceedings,582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M.
1515 (1980).
106. 230 N.L.R.B. at 1003. The Board intimated that if the closing had called for a major
financial reinvestment or for a change in the company's operation as a whole, there might have
been no duty to bargain. See Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 724 n.7 (3d Cir.
1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980). Such a holding would be a
retreat to the rationale of GeneralMotors; see notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text. In
Brockway the company had set a new policy to eliminate company-owned truck dealerships like
the Philadelphia dealership at issue in the case. This particular dealership had lost more money
than any other before its closing; after that closing the company liquidated all of its truck dealerships and manufacturing operations. See Brockway Motor Trucks, 251 N.L.RB. No. 23, 104
L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980). The facts of the case are thus almost identical to those of GeneralMotors:
the employer in that case similarly disposed of a company-owned truck dealership in furtherance
of a general corporate policy to sell such branches to independent dealer-owners. The liquidation
in Brockway Motors could hardly have been any less of a "withdrawal of capital" or have less
"affect[ed] the scope and ultimate direction of the enterprise" than in GeneralMotors. See id, 104
L.R.R.M. at 1518.
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even though the company has continued other operations.10 7 In Kingwood Mining Company, 0 8 for example, the employer shut down and
subcontracted out its coal-mining operations but continued to process
and sell coal. The Board found that mining was independent of
processing and selling and that by shutting down the coal mine, the
employer had left the mining business entirely. Noting that management's decision involved a substantial withdrawal of capital, the Board
found that a bargaining obligation would "significantly abridge [the
employer's] freedom to manage its own affairs."' 1 9 These facts differ
only slightly from those in Ozark Trailers and Royal Typewriter. In
Kingwood Mining the company did not completely eliminate itself as
an employer; the operations remaining were similar to those terminated. Moreover, the decision to withdraw capital by discontinuing a
discrete line of business substantially parallels the decisions made in
Ozark Trailers and Royal Typewriter to withdraw capital by closing a
plant and discontinuing production.110
The Board has also deferred to management when it has found a
need for immediate action or a lack of any alternative to a closing."'
In Brooks-Scanlon, Inc.,112 for example, the company informed the
union that it had decided to close one of its sawmill operations because
of an insufficient supply of local timber. A majority of the Board found
107. See Gray-Grimes Tool Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 736 (1974) (an automotive distributor closed its
parts manufacturing operation), modiFedon other grounds, 557 F.2d 1233 (6th cir. 1977); Stanley
Oil Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 219 (1974) (an employer closed its service department); Kingwood Mining
Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 844 (1974), aft'dsub nona UMW v. NLRB 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (a
company ceased its coal mining but continued to process and sell coal); Summit Tooling Co., 195
N.L.R.B. 479 (1972), enforced, 474 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1973) (a company ceased its manufacturing
of tool and die equipment).
108. 210 N.L.R.B. 844 (1974), ajf'dsub nom. UMW v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
109. 210 N.L.R.B. at 845.
110. See notes 102-04 supra and accompanying text. See also 92 HARV. L. REv. 768, 773-74
(1979).
111. See Brooks-Scanlon, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 102 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1979) (the loss of a
sufficient quantity of natural resource-pine timber--to continue business); Raskin Packing Co.,
246 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 102 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1979) (a bank unexpectedly withdrew its line of credit
and within hours the company decided to close); Key Coal Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 100
L.R.R.M. 1444 (1979) (an employer ceased its operation because of a lawsuit); M & M Transp.
Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 73 (1978) (a company terminated immediately upon learning it lacked funds to
continue operating or to meet its payroll); National Terminal Baking Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 465
(1971) (the theft of a second truck caused an employer to end its business). See also Kroehler
Mfg. Co., NLRB General Counsel Advice Memo #9-CA 9787, reprinted in 93 L.R.R.M. 1252
(1976) (an employer decided to relocate its plant rather than rebuild it after the structure was
destroyed by a tornado). In NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451 (6th Cir.
1979), the court held that the employer's fear that his natural gas supply would be curtailed was an
insufficient excuse for failing to bargain over the transfer of plant machinery and 15 jobs to a
Canadian facility.
112. 246 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 102 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1979).
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that bargaining would be futile because nothing could increase the supply of a limited natural resource, and it thus held that the unilateral
decision to close was lawful. 113 But the short supply of timber did not
preclude alternatives that the union might have proposed in order to
keep the plant open." 4 It had previously been the possibility of alternatives, rather than the probability of successful agreement, that was
the Board's5test of the employer's bargaining obligation in partial-closing cases."
Finally, in many instances the Board has found that a union
waives its right to bargain over a partial closing either by agreeing to
express contractual language reserving to management the right to
close an operation, or by failing to request bargaining after notice of
management's intentions to close. 1 6 In the case of InternationalOffset
Corp. 117 the employer failed to notify or bargain with two unions
before closing its printing operations. The Board ruled that the unions
knew or should have known that a shutdown was imminent in light of
the company's successive sales and transfers of machinery, the number
of layoffs, the newspaper advertisements concerning the possible sale of
assets by the company, and conversations with a company official. According to the Board, the union's failure to request bargaining despite
this knowledge precluded the finding of an 8(a)(5) violation." 8 In
many similar cases, however, the union knew of the company's poor
economic position or of the company's intention to close before the
actual decision was made, but the Board found no waiver of the
union's bargaining rights." 9 To say the least, unions will have difficulty predicting what knowledge the Board will consider sufficient to
113. Id.
114. Id, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1608 (Murphy, M., dissenting).
115. Id.
116. ABC Transnat'1 Transp., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 102 L.R.R.M. 1357 (1979); Key
Coal Co., 240 N.L.R.B. No. 153, 100 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1979); American Can Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 102
(1975), enforced, 535 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976); Vegas Vic, Inc., 213 N.L.R-B. 841 (1974), enforced,
546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977); Stanley Oil Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 219
(1974); International Offset Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 854 (1974); Manitowoc Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 994
(1970); New Era Shirt Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 975 (1970); United States Lingerie Corp., 170 N.L.R.B.
750 (1968); White Consol. Indus., 154 N.L.R.B. 1593 (1965); Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 305
(1964); Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 418 (1962). See also NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp.,
385 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1967); Schwarz, supra note 27, at 92-94.
117. 210 N.LR.B. 854 (1974).
118. Id at 855.
119. See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 101 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1979),
aft'd, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80544); Case, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 798 (1978). See also Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1277-78 (7th
Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which Judge Pell noted the
difference between the Board's holding is in cases such as InternationalOffset Corp. and its holdings in other partial-closing cases.
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shift the burden of requesting bargaining to the union, particularly because the union cannot be aware of exactly when the company will

actually cease operations.
As the Board has retreated from its Ozark Trailers approach, some

courts have moved closer to requiring collective bargaining in partial
closings.' 20 In Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB 121 the Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit modified the position it took in NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing,Inc.,122 and found that an employer is not
relieved of its duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) merely because the

123
partial closing results from unspecified "economic conditions."'

Rather, stated the court, the countervailing interests of the employers

and employees must be balanced in determining the duty to bargain.12 4
Because the employer in Brockway had failed to demonstrate that eco-

nomic factors compelled it to close without bargaining with the union,
the court found that the employer had violated the Act. Whether this

opinion reflects a change in the approach that the courts of appeals will
take in partial-closing or removal cases remains to be seen. These recent cases demonstrate, however, that the Board and the courts have

been moving in opposite directions, undoubtedly perplexing companies, unions, and employees.
120. See NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision),
cert.granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-544); Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264
(7th Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision); Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.) (2-1 decision),
cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 210 (1980); NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451 (6th
Cir. 1979) (3-0 decision); Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978) (2-1
decision), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
In Davis v. NLRB the employer changed its restaurant from a full-service dining facility to a
self-service cafeteria. The Court of Appeals for tae Seventh Circuit cited Ozark Trailers and
Brockway Motor Trucks with approval, 617 F.2d at 1268, but also noted that "[t]his is not the case

where an employer has exercised his managerial prerogative to terminate, relocate, liquidate or
sell his business or a part of it." Id The Court also found that the change in operation did not

involve major capital reinvestment; the holding therefore does not apply to a traditional partial
closing, in which a company decides to alter a significant portion of its operation.
Likewise, in NLRB v. ProductionMolded Plastics,Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit found that there was less than a partial closing:
In fact, they have neither sold nor abandoned, nor completely closed the "small plant" at
Alliance, Ohio. The transfer of some machinery and 15 jobs to their Canadian plant did
not involve any major commitment of capital to a new enterprise nor any withdrawal
from a previous line of company endeavor. Indeed, the same work continued to be performed on the same machinery in the Canadian plant, albeit by other employees.
604 F.2d at 453. Thus, one cannot say with certainty that the Seventh and Sixth Circuits would
extend their recent holdings to an employer's substantial termination of operations.
121. 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand,251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
122. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). See text accompanying notes 60 & 62 supra.
123. 582 F.2d at 739.
124. Id. at 737-40.
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II.

A.

CRITIQUE

The Deficiencies of the Board'sApproach.

The NLRB has shown too little deference to the needs of management when a company decides to close or relocate a plant. Although

labor-related costs can be a major factor in such decisions, there is usually a plethora of other considerations. A closing or relocation can result from the demands or the loss of a customer, 125 outdated machinery
or a need for expansion, l2 6 the elimination of reliable sources of pro-

duction materials,

27

or factors such as increased overhead expenses,

more dependable transportation, or a more advantageous marketing
128

position.
Before closing a plant, most corporations undoubtedly analyze the
costs and benefits.' 29 Often such studies require hiring consultants,

meeting with investment and legal advisers, and discussing the proposed closing with the board of directors. An ill-advised plant closing
30
or relocation can have disastrous effects on an entire business.'
Moreover, a partial liquidation frequently demands a speed and timing

that are absent from the typical collective bargaining situation. 131 In
such cases the Board should not judge the adequacy of the negotiations

that take place between an employer and a union by the same standards it uses in determining whether an employer has engaged in "surface bargaining" in a labor contract negotiation.1 32 The issues involved

in bargaining over the decision to close a plant will be relatively few in

3 3 Moreover, the
comparison to the typical labor contract negotiation.
125. See, e.g., NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
126. See, eg., United Steelworkers Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1
(N.D. Ohio), a.fd in part and rev'd inpart, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
127. See, e.g., Brooks-Scanlon, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 102 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1979).
128. Rubinstein, PlantRelocation andIts Effects on Labor ManagementRelations, 18 LAB. L.J.
544, 550-51 (1967); Swift, supra note 27, at 1137. For an interesting discussion of the many causes
which led to the closing of an automotive assembly plant, see Corley, Closing of a Ford Plant
Reects Rising Worry of Car Makers: Quality, Wall St. J., June 16, 1980, at 1, col 6.
129. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 206 (1964); MidlandRoss Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 979-80, 982-83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 210 (1980);
NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966). See also
Swift, supra note 27, at 1138.
130. Swift, supra note 27, at 1138.
131. See, e.g., Raskin Packing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 102 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1979); M & M
Transp. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 73 (1978); National Terminal Baking Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 465 (1971).
See also Kroeller Mfg. Co., NLRB General Counsel Advice Memo #9-CA 9787, reprintedin 93
L.R.R.M. 1252 (1976).
132. See note 90 supra.
133. Certainly the union will attempt to convince the employer not to close or transfer an
operation. The union may also want to negotiate the manner, timing, and implementation of the
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-union and the company will generally have opposite interests. When
the decision to close is supported by considerations outside the employment relationship, such as the exhaustion of essential production material or the loss of a necessary line of credit, the company may have
neither the time nor the ability to agree to union demands. For the
Board to require bargaining over almost all plant closing decisions, and
to apply its usual standards of good faith to such bargaining, will discourage rather than encourage bargaining. 134 Most employers will seek
to evade bargaining and few courts reviewing a Board order will find
that the employer had a duty to bargain.
Perhaps the major failure of the Board's bargaining requirement is
its insensitivity to the claim of employers that they cannot inform unions about a proposed partial closing for reasons of confidentiality.
Even the Supreme Court has noted that it is difficult to pledge union
representatives to the nondisclosure of sensitive information. 135 This is
particularly true when the negotiations concern the jobs of all employees in the bargaining unit. As some courts have suggested, untimely
leaks might have adverse consequences not only on employee morale
and relations with customers and suppliers, 36 but also with respect to
potential purchasers of the plant.
In addition, corporate officers risk liability under federal securities
laws if they reveal material information to a union before a final decidecision. See, e.g., Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1980). Finally, the union may

want to discuss the possible purchase of the business. See, e.g., United Steekworkers Local 1330 v.
United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. I (N.D. Ohio 1980), affidinpartandrev'din part, 631 F.2d
1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
134. For cases in which the Board has determined that an employer bargained with the union
over the decision to close a portion of a business but that the negotiations failed to satisfy section
8(a)(5), see ABC Trans-Nat'l Tranp., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 103 L.R.R.M. 1116 (1980); Ohio
Brake & Clutch Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 101 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1979); First Nat'l Maintenance
Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 101 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1979), a1'd, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-544); Case, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 798 (1978);
Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1974), enforced, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); Waiter
Pape, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 719 (1973).
135. In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979), a union had filed unfair labor
practice charges against an employer under section 8(a)(5) for the company's refusal to give the
union copies of tests used to determine promotions, and the answer sheets, which the union alleged it needed to process grievances. Both the Board and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit ordered the company to produce the tests and answer sheets, while ordering the union not
to disclose these to any employees who might take the test. See Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B.
1024 (1975), aft'd, 560 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1977), vacatedandremanded, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). The
Supreme Court held that such a confidentiality requirement could not be enforced since the union
was not a party to the proceeding under section 10(e) of the NLRA. 440 U.S. at 315-16. The
Court further noted that even if the union were considered a party and subject to contempt proceedings for violating the Court's order, any remedy available to the Court was inadequate because it could not protect against the "danger of inadvertent leaks." 440 U.S. at 316.
136. See note 78 supra.
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sion on a plant termination. If a union prematurely discloses information received from the employer that turns out to be incorrect, persons
who have bought or sold securities in reliance on the information might
sue both the company and management officials. 137 Defending suits
brought under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 138 or
other antifraud securities laws could prove costly.
If the Board continues to require employers to bargain over partial-closing decisions, it must devise means to protect legitimate management concerns. The Board has not yet fashioned sanctions for a
union's disclosure of nonpublic inside information; nor has it considered penalizing a union that unduly delays bargaining when, from the
employer's point of view, time is of the essence. Indeed, in partial closings the union has little incentive to conclude negotiations. The longer
that the union prolongs bargaining over the decision to close, by requiring information or discussing tangential matters, the longer its
members remain employed.
The Board should also resolve the uncertainties concerning when
the duty to bargain arises in plant termination cases. Although it is
137. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j (b), 78t (1976); rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1980). The closing of part of a business would certainly be a "material fact"
as it would be one 'which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the
corporation's stock or securities ...." Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1968),
quotedin SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971). If a corporate official improperly conceals or misrepresents a material fact, causing a
security transaction, he may be liable under the federal securities laws. See, e.g., SEC v. United
Fin. Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 358 n.9 (9th Cir. 1973) (concealment of the insolvency of affiliates);
Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 471 F.2d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 1973) (failure to disclose intent
to stop production of a significant product); Gladwin v. Medfield Corp., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,013, at 97,541 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (nondisclosure in proxy
materials of attempts to sell major assets); Pierre J. Lelandais & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc., 387 F.
Supp. 1310, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (proxy did not disclose a substantial change in the nature of the
business), modffled, 543 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); SEC v. Crofters, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 236, 242 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (concealment of inability to meet current obligations); Pappas v. Moss, 303 F. Supp. 1257, 1280 (D.N.J. 1969) (nondisclosure of financial
turnaround and misrepresentations about the price and date of a sale of stock); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 825-26, 828 (D. Del. 1951) (omission of facts regarding intent to
liquidate); Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 378-81 (1943) (failure to disclose intent to
liquidate business). See also A. BROMBERG & L. LoWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 4.2, 5.2, 7.2 (1979); Brudney,.4 Note on ChillingTender Solicitations,21 RUTGERS
L. REV.609, 635 n.61 (1967); Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115
U. PA. L. Rav. 317, 333-35 (1967); Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co- The Inside and Outside
ofRule 10b-5, 46 B.U. L. REy. 205, 222-23 (1966).
A company or corporate official might be sued not only for the omission or concealment of a
contemplated closing, but also for the premature disclosure of an intent to close, particularly if the
information proves incorrect. To avoid misrepresentation liability, corporations must ensure the
accuracy of any disclosure concerning a partial closing. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
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impossible for the Board to state precisely when negotiations must begin, Board decisions have been contradictory and do not provide adeis still
quate guidance to employers.' 39 An employer who negotiates
40
subject to the charge that the negotiations were untimely.
The Board's remedies for failures to bargain over partial closings
have also raised difficulties. Only rarely will it be practical for the
Board to require a company to reopen its plant and rehire its employees.14 ' But the Board remedy of awarding back wages to all employees
terminated as a result of the closing has sometimes been too harsh on
employers. One reason is that the Board typically orders payment of
back pay from the date of the refusal to bargain (the closing date)
rather than from the date of the Board's decision. 42 This is inappropriate when the question whether the bargaining obligation should
have existed at all is a close one. Even in Fibreboard the Supreme
Court approved the Board's award of back pay not from the date of the
improper subcontracting but from the date of the Board's supplemental
43
order requiring bargaining.
The Board typically continues back-pay liability either until the
company and union reach agreement or until a bona fide impasse occurs.144 As noted, there is little likelihood that the parties will agree139. The test set out in Ozark Trailers requires bargaining "once [the employer] has reached
the point of thinking seriously about taking such an extraordinary step as relocating or terminating a portion of his business." Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 569 (1966). Subsequent
cases, however, have not shed light on the meaning of this test. See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.
140. See note 134 supra.
141. See note 93 supra.
142. See National Family Opinion, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 102 L.R.R.M. 1641 (1979);
Caltrans Syss., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 102 L.R.R.M. 1417 (1979); Ohio Brake & Clutch Corp., 244
N.L.R.B. No. 5, 101 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1979); Victor Patino, 241 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 100 L.R.R.M. 1616
(1979). In Brockway Motor Trucks, 230 N.L.R.B. 1002, enforcement denied withoutprejudice to
commencement ofadditionalproceedings,582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 NLRB No.
23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980), and in Star Grocery Co., 237 N.L.R.B. 70 (1978), the Board modified its policy on back-pay orders when an employer refuses to bargain over a partial closing. In
both cases the Board held that the award of back wages should stop when the employer and union
commence bargaining rather than when the parties reach agreement or impasse. In National Family Opinion, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 102 L.R.R.M. 1641, 1642 (1979), howver, the Board overruled this aspect ofBrockway Motor Trucks and Star Grocery Co. and returned to the position that
the back-pay award would run from the date of the refusal to bargain, measured from the date of
closing. The award would run until the point of agreement or impasse, or until the union failed to
make a timely request for bargaining, or until the union bargained in bad faith.
143. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 208, 215-17 (1964).
144. See National Family Opinion, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 102 L.R.R.M. 1641, 1642
(1979); Caltrans Syss., Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 102 L.R.R.M. 1417, 1418 (1979); Ohio Brake &
Clutch Corp., 244 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 101 L.R.R.M. 1601, 1602 (1979); Victor Patino, 241
N.L.R.B. No. 76, 100 L.R.R.M. 1616, 1618 (1979); Metro Transp. Serv. Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 534
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particularly when the employer has already closed the plant and terminated the employees. Moreover, the time when a bona fide impasse
occurs during negotiations is not always evident.145 Again, the union in
such a situation will want to prolong bargaining and delay reaching an
impasse in order to increase the back-pay liability.
The stated purpose of the Board's back-pay remedy is to restore
the union's strength as it existed prior to occurrence of the unlawful
act. 4 6 The Board remedy, however, frequently puts employees in a
better position than if the company had met its bargaining obligation.
Generally, the employer would have closed the plant even if the company had negotiated; though the employer would have had to pay
wages during the time spent bargaining, this period would be much
shorter than the span covered by the Board's back-pay remedy. 47 Pay(1975); Winn-Dixie Stores, 147 N.L.R.B. 788 (1964), enforced, 361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1966). In
these cases the Board ordered a company to offer to bargain with a union over the resumption of a
closed business. It also ordered back pay to the employees terminated as a result of the closing
from the time the employee was discharged until the first of the following events occurs: (1) the
employer bargains to agreement with the union on the subjects pertaining to the decision to close
and the effects of the closing on the employees; (2) a bona fide impasse in bargaining results; (3)
the union fails to request bargaining within five days of the Board's decision or fails to commence
negotiations within five days of the employer's notice of his desire to bargain with the union; or (4)
the union fails to bargain in good faith.
In cases dealing with unlawful failures to bargain over effects of a closing, the Board usually
6rders back pay to commence five days after the date of its decision rather than the date of termination of the employee-on the theory that a make-whole remedy would be inappropriate when
the facility would have closed regardless of bargaining. The back pay continues until the employer reaches agreement with the union on the effects of the plant shutdown on its employees or
until one of the other three conditions mentioned above occurs. In the "effect" cases, the Board
also orders that in no event shall the sum paid to any employee exceed the amount he would have
earned as wages from the date the employer terminated its operations to the time the employees
secured equivalent employment elsewhere or the date the employer offered to bargain, whichever
occurs sooner. See, e.g., Vans Packing Plant, 211 N.L.R.B. 692 (1974).
145. An impasse exists when the Board finds that there is a substantial difference in the parties' positions over a significant issue and that the company and the union have exhausted all
means of settlement. Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967),petitionforreview deniedsub
nom. American Fed. of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See
also NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963); Fetzer Television v. NLRB, 317 F.2d
420 (6th Cir. 1963); Alsey Refractories Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 785 (1974). Courts and commentators
have explained, however, that the time when negotiators reach an impasse is often difficult to
determine. See Dallas Gen. Drivers Local No. 745 v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842, 844-45 (D.C. Cir.
1966). See also NLRB v. Yama Woodcraft, Inc., 580 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1978); Schatzki, The
Employer's UnilateralAct-.4 Per Se Violation-Sometimes, 44 TEx. L. REv. 470, 495 (1966);
Comment, Impasse in Collective Bargaining,44 TEx. L. REV. 769 (1966).
146. See note 91 supra.
147. In other words, if an employer considered closing a plant on January 1 and bargained
over the decision with the union until impasse was reached, as the Board requires, see, e.g., E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 753 (1971); G.W. Murphy Indus., 184 N.L.R.B. 62
(1971), perhaps three or four weeks of additional operations would be required. The employer
would be required to pay two or three weeks additional wages, even if the employer on his own
would have closed on January 1. In contrast, if the employer had unilaterally announced a cos-
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ment of back wages from the date of the failure to bargain in part gives
employees what they would have received had their bargaining demands been met. The Board's remedy in partial-closing cases thus re-

sembles the "make whole" remedy for an employer's failure to bargain
in good faith over contract issues-a remedy the courts have uniformly

rejected. 48 Although the Board has broad remedial powers under the
49
NLRA, it cannot assess penalties against an employer for a violation. 1
ing on January 1 and the Board found that this decision violated section 8(a)(5), the employer's
back-pay liability would run from the time of the closing and continue during Board proceedings;
if the Board ordered the employer to negotiate, his back-pay liability would extend until agreement or impasse is reached with the union. This process could last for months, if not years. See,
e.g., cases cited in notes 91-93 supra. See also 92 HARv. L. REV. 768, 776 (1979).

148. In International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB (Tiidee Products, Inc.), 426 F.2d
1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 950 (1970), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Board could order a recalcitrant employer who had violated section
8(a)(5) to compensate employees for wage increases and fringe benefits that they arguably would
have obtained through collective bargaining had the employer not unlawfully refused to bargain.
A similar "make whole" remedy was ordered by a trial examiner in a later case, but the Board
rejected the trial examiner's proposed order and the reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit
in Tidee Products. See Ex-Cel-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). The Board relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99 (1970), for the proposition that the Board lacked statutory authority to grant such a remedy. In H.K Porter the Supreme Court held that the Board cannot order a party to incorporate
into a collective bargaining agreement a specific provision to which that party has not agreed. Id
at 107. The Board determined that a "make whole" order would be punitive and speculative
because the Board could not objectively determine what terms the parties would have agreed upon
if an employer had promptly bargained, or indeed whether any agreement would have been
reached at all. See also Tiidee Products, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 705, 714 (1969), enforced inpart and
remanded in part sub nom., International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970). Because the Supreme Court has subsequently held
that the Board and not the courts of appeals have the primary responsibility for fashioning remedies, the Board's rejection of the "make whole" remedy has generally been followed. See NLRB
v. Food Store Employees Local 347 (Heck's, Inc.), 417 U.S. 1 (1974); Winn-Dixie Stores Co., Inc.
v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 1343, 1351 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985 (1978); Tex Tan Welhausen
Co. v. NLRB, 434 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971). See also Bartosic &
Lanoff, Escalatingthe StruggleAgainst Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHi. L. REv. 255 (1972);
Morris, The Role ofthe NLRB andthe Courtsinthe Collective BargainingProcess: A FreshLook at
Conventional W4rsdom and UnconventionalRemedies,30 VAND. L. REV. 661 (1977); St. Antoine, A
Touchstonefor Labor BoardRemedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039 (1968).

In NLRB v. W.R. Grace & Co., 571 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978), the Court affirmed the Board's
finding that an employer violated its duty to bargain when it discontinued production of one
material because of economic considerations and laid off four employees without consulting the
union. The ..ourt rejected the Board's order (a common one in partial-closing cases) that the
company place the terminated employees on a preferential hiring list and offer reinstatement
should it resume production. See note 92 supra. The court believed that this would be tantamount to the Board compelling an agreement on a substantive contractual provision to which the
parties did not agree, "on the basis of an assumption as to what the parties would have agreed to
absent an employer's failure to bargain in good faith." 571 F.2d at 283.
149. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 7, 10-11 (1940); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257-59 (1939).
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Perhaps the most serious deficiency in the Board's approach to
partial closings has been its failure to consistently apply Ozark Trailers.
After weighing the interests of employers and employees when a plant
is closed or relocated, the Board concluded in Ozark Trailers that the
NLRA imposes a general duty on employers to bargain over such decisions. But in General Motors Corp., Royal Typewriter, and Brockway
Motors, the Board has inconsistently applied this policy. Such wavering by an administrative agency naturally makes a reviewing court suspicious of the agency's basic policy decision.150 Also, rather than
adhering to its interpretation that the duty to bargain exists in all partial-closing cases or making its construction more flexible, the Board
has handled the more difficult cases, such as KingwoodMining, BrooksScanlon, and InternationalOffset Corp., by finding tortuous exceptions
to its general rule.15 ' This type of ad hoc decision-making makes it
difficult for employers and unions to predict the Board's approach in a
particular plant-closing situation.
B.

The Deciencies of the Courts of Appeals' Approach.

Though the Board's approach to partial closings has been inconsistent and in many respects unsound, the appellate court decisions in this
area have misapplied the National Labor Relations Act and have misconstrued the purposes of collective bargaining. As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit clearly stated in NLRB v. William J. Burns
InternationalDetective Agency, Inc.,152 courts will not find a violation
of an employer's section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain under Fibreboardunless the employer also violates section 8(a)(3) by closing an operation
with the requisite improper motive under Darlington.153 As a result, an
employer will seldom be required to bargain over plant shutdowns or
relocations, both because the Darlington standards of proof are very
difficult to meet and because an employer will usually have some economic justification for closing a plant.
150. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976), regarding pregnancy discrimination, in part because
the interpretation conflicted with an earlier determination of the Commission: "We have declined
to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they conflicted with earlier pronouncements
of the agency." See also United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 n.25
(1975); Espinozah v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92-96 (1973).
151. See notes 107-19 supra and accompanying text.
152. 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965).
153. Id at 902. Some judges still hold this view. See, e.g., Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264,
1274-75 (7th Cir. 1980) (Pell, J., dissenting).
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The appellate courts' analysis confuses some of the basic distinc-

tions between sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. When unilateral employer action undermines a union's ability to represent its
members, subjective bad faith against the union is unnecessary for a
finding that the employer breached section 8(a)(5). t54 The elimination

of all or substantially all jobs without bargaining, as in a closing, certainly impairs the union's ability to function as the collective bargaining representative, regardless of the employer's economic motivation.
Indeed, in Fibreboard,which involved a termination of jobs through
subcontracting, the Supreme Court did not make illegal motive an element of a refusal-to-bargain offense under section 8(a)(5). 155

Moreover, the gravamen of a section 8(a)(3) offense differs significantly from that of a section 8(a)(5) offense. The injury in a discrimination case is primarily to individual employees and only secondarily,
if at all, to the union. 156 The typical remedy in section 8(a)(3) cases is

to compensate the individual victims of discrimination for the financial
injury caused by the illegal act. 157 In addition, the Board generally or-

ders the employer to act with a proper justification toward employees
in the future. In a refusal-to-bargain case, on the other hand, the injury
is essentially to the union. The typical remedy in these cases is to re58
quire the employer to meet its obligation to bargain in good faith.1 If

154. In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Board found that an employer committed an
unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5) by implementing changes in wages and sick leave without bargaining with the union. There was no finding of bad faith in the failure to negotiate.
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the Board's finding. See also H.J. Heinz Co.v. NLRB, 311 U.S.
514 (1941); Electri-Flex Co. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 911 (1978);
Buffalo Bituminous, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d 267 (8th Cir. 1977); Rust Craft Broadcasting of N.Y.,
Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 327 (1976).
155. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), did not require the Board
to find an illegal motive before concluding that an employer violated its section 8(a)(5) duty to
bargain. Seealso Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1980); Brockway Motor Trucks v.
NLRB,582 F.2d 720, 735 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515
(1980); East Bay Union of Machinists, Local 1304 v.NLRB,322 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C.Cir. 1963)
("It is not necessary to find an anti-union animus as a predicate for a conclusion that the employer
[who unilaterally subcontracted out bargaining-unit work] violated Section 8(a)(5)"). Bliss, supra
note 27, at 272-73.
156. Section 8(a)(3) states that itisan unfair labor practice to discriminate "inregard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment." 29 U.S.C.§ 158(a)(3) (1976).
Of course,a company employs only an individual, not a union. On the other hand, section 8(a)(5)
forbids an employer from refusing to-bargain "with the representatives of his employees." Id
§ 158(a)(5).
157. As the Supreme Court stated inPhelps Dodge Corp.v.NLRB,313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941);
"Making the workers whole for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice ispart of the
vindication of the public policy which the Board enforces." See also NLRB v.J.H. Rutter-Rex
Mfg.Co., 396 U.S. 258, 263 (1969); Nathanson v.NLRB,344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952).
158. "The usual remedy for an employer's refusal to bargain inviolation of Section 8(a)(5) is
an order (1)to cease and desist from failing to bargain and (2)upon request, to bargain collec-
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section 8(a)(3) were applied to partial-closing cases, the employer
would be required to remain in business until its anti-union animus
had dissipated and it could prove it had a legitimate reason for going
out of business. Section 8(a)(5), however, would allow an employer to
cease operations once it had met its duty to bargain in good faith.' 59
Finally, even when the employees receive monetary damages for an
employer's failure to bargain over a partial closing, the purpose of the
award is not to remedy an injury to the employees but rather to restore
the union's bargaining strength in negotiations over the closing decision.1 60 These basic distinctions in the two sections of the Act show
that section 8(a)(5), rather than section 8(a)(3), is the proper section
under which to analyze the duty to bargain in partial-closing cases.
Some courts have interpreted the language of section 8(d), which
does not include partial closings in the list of required subjects of bargaining, and the legislative history behind the section, to mean that
there is no duty to negotiate concerning shutdown decisions.' 6' This
theory misconstrues congressional intent regarding mandatory subjects
of bargaining. When Congress amended the NLRA in 1947, section
2(11) of the House bill carefully listed the subjects over which unions
and employers were required to bargain, stating that these were the
only topics that the parties needed to discuss. 162 The House Report
specified that the bill so limited mandatory items of negotiation to insulate employers from bargaining over how the business was run. 163 The
tively regarding rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment." C. MORRIS,
supra note 9, at 857. See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
159. See Rabin, supra note 27, at 820.
160. See notes 91 & 144 supra.
161. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
162. The version that initially passed the House, H.R. No. 3020, stated:
Such terms shall not be construed as requiring that either party reach an agreement with
the other, accept any proposal or counterproposal either in whole or in part, submit
counterproposals, discuss modification of an agreement during its terms except pursuant
to the express provisions thereof, or discuss anysubject matterother than thefollowing: (i)
wage rates, hours of employment and work requirements; (ii) procedures and practices
relating to discharge, suspension, layoff, recall, seniority and discipline, or to promotion,
demotion, transfer and assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the place of
employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and(v) administrative and procedural
provisions relating to the foregoing subjects.
H.R. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23, 49 (1947).
163. The House Report stated:
[The union has no right to bargain with the employer about who his agents will be, what
p rices he will charge, what his profits shall be, or how he shall manage his business, so
ong as he does not violate the union's contract with him or ignore his obligations under
the Labor Act.
H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 162, at 22-23.
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Senate version, 164 however, contained no provision similar to the
House's section 2(11) and the conference committee rejected the House
provision as an attempt to "straightjacket" and to "limit narrowly the
subject matters appropriate for collective bargaining."1 65 The final bill
deleted the House section and used the more general language of the
166
Senate version, which now appears as section 8(d).

In other contexts courts have approved of a flexible approach to
mandatory bargaining issues and have realized that some matters
evolve into mandatory subjects of negotiation because of social needs,
industrial experience, or technological advancement. 167 For example,

at one time the Supreme Court held that stock purchase plans, group
insurance, and medical insurance were matters outside the scope of re-

quired discussions between companies and unions. 168 Today these
items are not only mandatory subjects of bargaining, but are at the
heart of negotiations between companies and unions. 169 In choosing
the less restrictive approach to the scope of the collective bargaining
duty, Congress delegated the primary task of determining the proper
boundaries of the bargaining obligation to the National Labor Relations Board. 70 The legislative history does not support the suggestion
164. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
165. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947). The Senate explicitly rejected the House
proposal and stated in its report:
This section [§ 2(11)] attempts to limit narrowly the subject matters appropriate for collective bargaining. It seems clear that the definitions are designed to exclude collective
bargaining concerning welfare funds, vacation funds, union hiring halls, union security
provisions, apprenticeship qualifications, assignment of work, checkoff provisions, subcontractingof work, and a host of other matters traditionally the subject matter of collective bargaining in some industries or in certain regions of the country. The appropriate
scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula; it will inevitably. depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at any given
time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related factors. What are proper
subject matters for collective bargaining should be left in the first instance to employees
and trade unions, and in the second place, to any administrative agency skilled in the
field and competent to devote the necessary time to a study of industrial practices and
traditions in each industry or area of the country, subject to review by the courts. It
cannot and should not be straitjacketed by legislative enactment.
Id (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 162, at 22-23; 93 CONo. REc. 364950 (1947) (remarks of Rep. Norton).
166. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976)); see 93
CONG. REc. 6444 (1947) (summary report of Sen. Taft).
167. See, eg., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979). See also notes 10-26, 165 supra,
180-82 infra and accompanying text. Industrial experience, one of the factors the Supreme Court
relied on in Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 211-12, has favored contractual clauses requiring notice and
bargaining before closing a plant. See Rabin, supra note 27, at 822-23 (over 21% of contracts in a
1969 Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey contained some express restriction on management's right
to terminate or transfer operations).
168. J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).
169. See notes 12-14, 23 supra. See also R. ROwAN, COLLECrivE BARGAINING: SURVIVAL IN
rHm '70s? 359, 371 (1972).
170. See note 165 supra.
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that the Board is without power to define the issues that parties must
discuss prior to implementation. On the contrary, the legislative history indicates that the appellate courts should defer to the Board's administrative expertise in defining the expanding concept of mandatory
171
subjects of bargaining.
Most appellate court decisions also misperceive-the role of collective bargaining in our labor relations system. These courts have focused on partial closings only from the viewpoint of management. The
test appellate courts apply 172 recognizes as relevant considerations only
the employer's tangible capital investment and the need to minimize
loss to investors in a business that has become unprofitable. According
to the courts the most efficient way to minimize financial injury to a
company and its shareholders is to allow management to decide quickly and unilaterally when an operation should be terminated. This analysis, however, overlooks the intangible investments made by the
workers. The service capital supplied by employees is as necessary to a
business as the property capital supplied by investors. 73 The employees' commitment to a company often involves years of training, the development of specialized skills, and the ordering of their lives around
an employer's business. Certainly any prudent management would not
decide to liquidate or move its own investment without extensive
financial and legal advice from many experts. 174 Similarly, a company
should not be allowed to destroy the investment of employees through
permanent job terminations associated with a shutdown, without providing workers an opportunity to participate in the decision-making
process through collective bargaining.
One of the fundamental purposes of the NLRA is to encourage a
sharing of decision-making in areas affecting both the employer and
the employees in order to reduce industrial strife. 175 Senator Wagner
explained the philosophy behind the duty to bargain as the implementation of "democracy in industry [, which] means fair participation by
those who work in the decisions vitally affecting their lives and liveli171. This was stated recently by the Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S.

488, 496 (1979).
172. For a description of the test used by the appellate courts, see notes 59-69 supra and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of such worker and employer investment, compare Green, The Casefor
the Sit-Down Strike, 90 NEw REPUBLIC 199-200 (1937) with Comment, supra note 75, at 1091-95.
As to the effects a large plant closing can have on employees, unions, and the surrounding community, see Sease, Closing ofa Steel Mill Hits Workers in U.5. With Little Warning, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 23, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
174. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
175. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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Certainly a decision causing the total loss of bargain-

ing-unit jobs and the ousting of the employees' collective bargaining
representative vitally affects both workers and their unions. If the
NLRA requires an employer to bargain with a union over such relatively mundane items as the prices of goods in a vending machine be7
cause of their effect on the terms and conditions of employment, 7 it
should also require negotiations over the very livelihood of workers. 178
The courts of appeals' test does not adequately take into account
the rationale behind the duty to bargain under the NLRA. The foun179
dation of the courts' theory has instead been economic efficiency.
Courts have feared that the inconvenience and delay caused by negotiations will reduce or eliminate opportunities to shift capital to more
profitable investments or to minimize losses. Yet courts have long realized that collective bargaining obligations may cause economic loss.
For example, under the Act an employer must bargain with the union
over a work-preservation clause; this not only hinders but could even
prevent technological advance in an industry.18 0 The Supreme Court
has held that collective bargaining in such instances is the favored
176. M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 321 (1970) (citing N.Y.
Times, Apr. 13, 1937, at 20, col. 1).
177. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
178. Such a duty to negotiate would not change the basic structure of collective bargaining by
raising unions to the level of management, though some commentators have so argued. See, e.g.,
Goetz, supra note 27, at 10. Giving employee representatives an opportunity to negotiate before

the closing of a plant hardly amounts to the co-determination approach adopted in some European countries. See Summers, Worker Partioationin the U.S. and West Germany: A Comparalive Studyfrom an American Perspective,28 AM. J. CoMP. L. 367 (1980); von Boehmer, The New
Co-Determination Act in West Germany (pt. 1), 121 SOLICITORS' J. 485 (1977); Wiedemann,
Codeterminationby Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1980). Unions would
not become directors of a company with responsibility for such management functions as layoffs,
pricing, marketing, or the method of production. Rather, workers would be given only a traditional forum--collective bargaining-4n which to voice their concerns about an issue of the highest importance to them. Once the employer has bargained in good faith over the partial closing, it
could implement its determination regardless of the union's objections. In fact, by allowing the
assertion of employee ideas about a partial closing through negotiations, the parties would not
only fulfill the principles of industrial democracy that underlie the NLRA but also might preserve
the collective bargaining system from more drastic changes in directions such as co-determination.
179. See notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text.
180. In National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967), a construction contractor and a carpenters' union negotiated a clause that prevented the contractor from using doors
that had been fitted before being furnished for installation. The Court found this work-preservation clause to be lawful because it protected the job-site work of the carpenters, even though it
stood in the way of innovation. See also NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507
(1977); NLRB v. Gamble Enterprises, 345 U.S. 117 (1953); American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n
v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); St. Antoine, Secondary Boycotts andHot Cargo: A Study in Baance of Power, 40 U. DET. L.J. 189 (1962); 90 HARV. L. Rnv. 815 (1977).
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means to handle the displacement of workers by modernization.'

81

The balance struck in the work-preservation context demonstrates that

our system of labor relations prefers negotiations to unilateral decisions
that permanently displace workers, even if the negotiations sacrifice

82
some economic efficiency.'
Some courts have also stated that bargaining over plant closings is

futile because economic considerations ultimately dictate the outcome,

and because the complex financial issues involved are beyond the unions' expertise.' 8 3 The obligation to bargain under the NLRA, how-

ever, does not require that the employer and union reach agreement; it
requires only that they negotiate in good faith to an impasse. Although
the parties are expected to make a reasonable effort to agree, the possi-

standard
bility rather than the probability of agreement is the statutory
84
to determine if a bargaining obligation should exist.'

Employees and unions have frequently played a pivotal role in
keeping a business functioning or a plant open. 8 5 Employees have
often agreed to forego or defer wage and benefit increases or to make

other concessions to save a plant and thereby their jobs.' 8 6 The most
pronounced example of such action is the recent efforts by the United

Auto Workers to contribute to the rescue of the Chrysler Corporation. 18 7 In other situations labor organizations and employees have in181. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 100 S. Ct. 2305, 2314 (1980). This
view directly contradicts Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboardthat Congress intended to place the decision about automation and technological change solely in the hands of
management. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
182. There is scant proof, however, that requiring bargaining over a decision to close will in
fact hinder capital movement. See 92 HARV. L. Rav. 768, 775-76 (1979).
183. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
184. See Brockway Motor Trucks, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980). See also
Brooks-Scanlon, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 76, 102 L.R.R.M. 1606 (1979) (Murphy, M., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., Midland-Ross v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 982-83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct.
210 (1980); Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand,
251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 569-70
(1966); Rabin, supra note 27, at 823-26; Rabin, supra note 62, at 156.
186. For example, under threat of closing the plant because of poor financial conditions, employees at Uniroyal, Inc., represented by the United Rubber Workers recently agreed to a wage
and benefit reduction plan that reduced the firm's labor costs by 12.9% over 17 months. BNA
News and Background Information. 104 Lab. Rel. Rep. 267-68 (1980). Steelworkers at Kaiser
Steel Corporation have agreed to similar reductions, BNA News and Background Information,
105 Lab. Rel. Rep. 38 (1980), as have employees at Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corporation, Wall
St. J., Feb. 15, 1980, at 4, col. 5.
187. In bargaining for the labor contract that was signed on October 25, 1979, the United Auto
Workers made numerous concessions to the Chrysler Corp. that it had not made to General Motors Corp. or Ford Motor Co., whose contracts were negotiated earlier. Among these were: (1)
delayed increases in basic wages, which saved $203 million; (2) quarterly rather than weekly payments of cost-of-living allowance increases, which were estimated as equivalent to a $35 million-ayear loan; (3) one year deferral of $200 million in pension contributions; and (4) acceptance of 20
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vested their own funds in the employer's business to help avoid a
shutdown.'8 8 Bargaining may also convince management that laborrelated closing costs, such as payment of accrued benefits for severance,
vacations, and holidays, are greater than the savings that would result
from ceasing plant operations. 189 Even if the union cannot overturn
the closing decision, the timing and method of announcing the decision
to close may be negotiated in order to lessen the adverse impact on
employees.' 90 Unions might also bargain with the company to delay
the closing in order to find a purchaser of the operation and thus save
the employees' jobs.191
Indeed, rather than damaging employee morale and discipline,
frank discussions with unions prior to a decision to close may have the
opposite effect. The Wilson Freight Company recently asked its 3400
employees to make substantial personal investments in the company in
order to stave off bankruptcy. More than 97% of the workers responded by signing preliminary stock subscriptions for $10.7 million.
Further, management reported that morale among employees improved considerably once laborers realized the financial plight of the
paid holidays rather than the 26 that were negotiated with General Motors and Ford. LAB. REL.
YEARBOOK 5 (1979); N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, § D, at 6, col. 3; Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1979, at 3, col.
1.
Additionally, the UAW members of the Chrysler Corp. recently ratified a freeze on wages
and pension benefits through September, 1982, and an immediate rollback on all cost-of-living
adjustments for the remainder of the contract term. It has been calculated that this will save the
corporation over $670 million in labor costs. The employees' sacrifices were necessary to qualify
Chrysler for federally-guaranteed loans that the company needed to remain in business. BNA
News and Background Information, 105 Lab. Rel. Rep. 339 (1980); Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1981, at 3,

col. I; Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
188. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 736 n.n. 89, 90 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980); BNA News and Background Information,
104 Lab. Rel. Rep. 239 (1980) (company stockholders of Rath Packing Co. of Waterloo, Iowa,
approved selling a controlling interest to employees and added 10 union-nominated directors to
the 16-member board to avert a shutdown); Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1980, at 4, col. 5 (employee loans
to Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., a trucking firm, in order to continue operation); Wall St. J., June 10, 1964,
at 10, col. 5 (UAW local invests in Divco-Wayne Corp., a bus production firm, and agrees to take
wage cuts and change work rules to keep plant from closing and transferring its operations).
189. See Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 736 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251
N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 104 (1980). These costs can mount quite rapidly and be a significant factor in a closing decision. For instance, United Merchants, a textile company, recently
agreed to pay $1.4 million to three unions for distribution to 5,000 former employees as severance
pay. Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1980, at 12, col. 4.
190. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 736 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251
N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
191. See, e.g., United Steelworkers Local 1330 v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. I
(N.D. Ohio), af'dinpartand rev'din part, 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980) (the employees and the
union sought to enter into purchase negotiations with United States Steel when the company
announced the closing of its Youngstown plant and the termination of 3500 employees).
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company and the role they could play in saving their jobs.19 2
The argument that unions cannot understand the financial aspects
of a business closing is also erroneous. Union representatives must
have a sophisticated understanding of finance and investment in-order
to negotiate with employers. Furthermore, unions directly or indirectly
control the investments of billions of dollars in pension, health and
welfare, and other benefit funds.'9 3 There is no lack of financial expertise in most labor organizations.
The courts' presumption that bargaining over a decision to close
would be ineffectual substitutes a judicial conclusion for the possibility
of an agreement between the parties. By holding that an employer
need not bargain about a partial closing, the courts preordain the outcome: the plant will close. Even if it is improbable that the company
and union would agree on measures to keep a plant in business, the
NLRA requires that the opportunity to agree should be left to the parties, not foreclosed by the courts.
Even legitimate management interests in partial closings, such as
confidentiality and timing, are overstated by the courts. Although
many courts rely on these factors to find no obligation to negotiate,
there has not been a single case in which an employer has shown a
necessity for secret or expeditious action that would render its negotiations prior to a decision impracticable. 94 For example, International
Association of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines 95 concerned a merger
that resulted in a plant shutdown and the attendant loss of jobs. The
court found no duty to bargain, stating that "merger negotiations require... secrecy, flexibility and quickness ... .,,196 The company
did not, however, actually prove any of these interests. The court noted
that the company had engaged in merger discussions with another airline on four previous occasions. Thus, one can hardly say time was of
the essence or that the possibility of a merger was a well-kept secret.
Also, before the merger could be consummated, the company needed
192. Wall St. J., July 3, 1980, at 19, col. 4.

193. Most estimates show that as of 1978 there was over $500 billion in pension funds and that
such funds were growing at the rate of approximately 10% per year. J. RiFKIN & R. BARBER, THE
NORTH WILL RISE AGAiN 234 n.13 (1978); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DFasT OF
COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979, No. 545, at 340. By the late 1980s,
pension fund portfolios could be worth $1.3 trillion. Raskin, Pension Funds CouldBe the Unions'
Secret Weapon, FORTuNE, Dec. 31, 1979, at 64. One authority has estimated that unions, or
unions and employers together, controlled at least $200 billion of pension funds in 1978. J.
RiFKIN & R. BARBER, supra, at 235 n.16.

194. See notes 59-69 & 74-95 supra and accompanying text.
195. 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). See notes 76-77 supra and

accompanying text.
196. 473 F.2d at 557. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
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the approval of its shareholders and of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

There was no evidence that discussions with the union prior to the final
decision would jeopardize the merger or cause leaks of information.

Before they rely on secrecy and speed to allow a company to refuse to
bargain, courts should require the company to show that a need for
secrecy or speed actually exists.197 Even if these needs are present, the
Board and the courts can use alternate means to ensure that employees
or their representatives do not unduly delay proceedings or divulge

privileged information.19 8
The courts of appeals' attitude toward the need for confidentiality

in partial closings is somewhat puzzling in view of their holdings on
bargaining over the effects of closings. As noted previously, the courts

agree with the Board that employers have a duty to bargain with unions over the effects of a partial closing. 199 This obligation includes not
only the requirement to discuss the effects of the closing, but also to

give timely, prior notice of the bargaining subject. 2°° In most cases the
company will thus reveal information about the decision to close prior
to its implementation. Such notice to bargain over the effects of the
closing eliminates the element of secrecy as completely as would notice
to bargain over the decision to close.
III.

PROPOSAL

Both the Board's and the appellate courts' current approaches to
the duty to bargain in partial shutdowns are too inflexible to weigh
properly the competing interests of management and labor. A uniform

approach must be adopted that balances all the parties' legitimate interests and that also takes into account the specific facts of each case.

One device that the Board has used in other areas that requires a flexible approach is the evidentiary presumption. 20 ' When the Board's ex-

197. See, e.g., NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No. 80-544); Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir. 1980); Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 210
(1980); Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B.
No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
198. See notes 214-20 infra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text. See also Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB,
533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); Morrison Cafeterias Consol., v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Thompson Transp.
Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976); Rabin, supra note 62, at 155.
201. A rebuttable presumption is a device to shift "the burden of producing evidence, and...
under the preferable view operates to assign the burden of persuasion as well." C. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 806 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). For a decision upholding the
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perience with a particular problem reveals a clear pattern, it often has
established rebuttable presumptions to allocate the burden of proof.
For example, the Board has declared that an employer's rule banning
union solicitation of workers by other workers is presumptively valid
when applied during work time on the company's premises, but presumptively invalid with respect to employees who are not on company
2
time.20
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently encouraged
the use of presumptions with regard to the duty to bargain over a decision to close a plant for economic reasons. The court in Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB 203 concluded that a partial closing that resulted in
job terminations fell within the literal meaning of affecting "terms and
conditions of employment" and that negotiations over the decision to
close would help avoid industrial conflict. The court therefore held
that in a partial-closing situation the first step is to presume that the
decision to close is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Next, stated the
be considered carefully to determine
court, the facts of the case should
20°
if the inference is justified.
NLRB's use of rebuttable presumptions, see, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793, 804 (1945). Some have criticized the Board's use of rebuttable presumptions rather than its
formal rulemaking powers under section 6 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1976). See Bernstein, The
NLRB's Adjudication.Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE
LJ. 571 (1970); Peck, A Critique of the NationalLabor Relations Board's Peormancein Policy
Formulation:Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968); Peck, The Atrophied
Rule-Making Powers of the NationalLabor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961). But see
Note, NLRB Rulemaking: PoliticalReality Versus ProceduralFairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980).
202. See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1944),
cited with approvalin Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945). See also
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). The Board has created many other rebuttable presumptions with respect to organizational solicitations. See, e.g., Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 615, 620-21 (1962); Marshall Field & Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 182, 183 (1951).
The Board has established rebuttable presumption rules in other areas. See Retired Persons
Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1975) (presumption of majority status); NLRB v.
Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1965) (polling of employees by employer is presumptively
unlawful); Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967) (polling of employees by employer is
presumptively unlawful).
203. 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
204. 582 F.2d at 735. The Second Circuit followed this approach in NLRB v. First Nat'l
Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1981) (No. 80-544), as did the Third Circuit in Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 210 (1980). The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have cited Brockway
Motor Trucks with approval. Davis v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 604 F.2d 451, 453 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979).
In FirstNationalMaintenance the Second Circuit seemed to disagree with Brockway Motor
Trucks about the interests that a court should consider in presuming bargaining to be required. It
found that the NLRA's bargaining requiement should be paramount, rather than the relative
economic injury to the employer vis-a-vis the employees. 627 F.2d at 601. A close reading of
Brockway Motor Trucks shows, however, that the Third Circuit considered both factors. This
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The Third Circuit's rule in partial-closing cases is an example of
properly using rebuttable presumptions. A company generally shuts
down an operation because the costs of production have outstripped
the income from the sale of the product.20 5 Labor-related costs are the
largest component of the cost of producing a commodity. 20 6 In most
cases, if the employer can reduce his labor costs below a certain point
the operation can again become profitable and the need for a shutdown
can be avoided. Because labor costs are within the joint control of
companies and unions and are clearly mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA,2 07 negotiations over the amount of wages and
benefits paid can affect the decision to close. Given the importance of a
shutdown to both management and labor, and considering that the primary reason for closing is typically a negotiable subject, a rebuttable
presumption that an employer and a union should bargain over a decision to close is proper.
If the employer fails to bargain over a decision to close, he should
bear the burden of proving that the primary reason for the closing was
an economic necessity outside the employment relation.2 0 8 Antiquated
plant equipment, the loss of an essential source of supply, or the inability to meet the demands of a customer can cause shutdowns and are
unlikely to be affected by negotiations with the workers. To require
bargaining in these instances would be futile and would fulfill no valid
purposes of the Act. Similarly, in some cases an employer may be able
to demonstrate that bargaining would result in irreparable harm because of a need for immediate action or confidentiality. If a company
approach is appropriate. For instance, if an employer unexpectedly lost its major source of credit,
it could suffer irreparable harm if required to remain open until it bargained with the union. To
require bargaining, however, might fulfill the purposes of the NLRA because the union might be
willing to supply the necessary funds until another credit source was found. But even the Board
has not required negotiations over the decision to close when to do so would cause overriding
financial harm to the employer. Raskin Packing Co., 246 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 102 L.R.R.M. 1489
(1979); M & M Transp. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 73 (1978).
205. If a company shuts down one of its operations for anti-union reasons, the Darlington test
applies. See notes 50-58 supra and accompanying text. If the company closes a plant in order to
avoid bargaining with a union, a "runaway shop" situation exists. See C. Moiuus, supra note 9,
at 122; Bliss, supra note 27, at 262-63.
206. In the private sector, labor costs are not only greater than nonlabor payments per unit,
but also have risen at a faster rate than nonlabor payments since 1950. See CurrentLabor Statistics, 103 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 95 (1980). As one noted authority stated: "Labor cost is the single
most important component ofprice, and in recent years it has constituted about 62-1/2% to 65% of
price. As a consequence, there is a fairly close correlation over time between changes in unit labor
costs and changes in prices." G. BLOOM & H. NORTHRUP, ECONOMICS OF LABOR RELATIONS 389
(8th ed. 1977).
207. See notes 10-26 supra and accompanying text.
208. See Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 738-39 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand,
251 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 104 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1980).
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can show any of these circumstances by sufficient evidence, the Board

that collecshould find that the company has rebutted the 20presumption
9
closing.
to
prior
required
tive bargaining was
But if the Board finds that an employer has avoided all bargaining
and has failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the presump-

tion in favor of negotiations, the Board should order back pay from the
date of the refusal to bargain.210 In these cases the company has completely ignored the valid concerns of its employees and their union by
terminating jobs without giving the employees or their representatives a
chance to influence the decision. The employees' injury, therefore,

should be fully compensated.
If, however, the employer does bargain before announcing the
closing decision, he should be presumed to have fulfilled his duty to

bargain. This presumption would be overcome only by a showing that
the bargaining was not in good faith. A key indicator of bad faith

would be notice of the closing too late to allow sufficient time for negotiations. Generally a company has an opportunity to engage in timely
negotiations since a shutdown decision involves some period of study.
Before a company makes its plans final, it should notify and negotiate
with the union.21 1 If the company does bargain with the union before it

announces the closing decision, the Board should assume, subject to a
good-faith inquiry, that the union's proposals in negotiations were

taken into account even though an employer rejected them and decided
to cease operations. The employer's bargaining obligation does not re-

quire negotiation to agreement; it requires only good-faith considera209. As long as labor-related costs are a part of the reason for the closing, an employer should
be required to meet its duty to bargain before the termination decision. See, e.g., Davis v. NLRB,
617 F.2d 1264, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1980). But f NLRB v. First Nat'1 Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d
596 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kearse, J., dissenting in part) (no duty to bargain when closing is caused by
inability to agree on management fee), cert. granted,49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No.
80-544).
210. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
211. There is considerable confusion in Board opinions, see notes 82-89 supra and accompanying text, about when management should inform union officials of the impending decision to
close. One recent study suggested that a company is aware of the need to shut down between two
and six months in advance of the closing, see Wall St. J., July 22, 1980, at 1, col. 5 (survey by Peter
Small & Assoc.), but others have theorized that one to two weeks is all that is necessary, see
Fastiff,supra note 27, at 283. Certainly management's ability to inform a union that it is considering a closing will turn on the circumstances of each case. Management will usually engage in a
thorough study before deciding to close. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text. Hence,
an employer should notify the union of the possibility of closing and offer to bargain over the
decision when it completes its studies and plans. See Swift, supra note 27, at 1148. Only then can
the employer meet its statutory duty to furnish information regarding the closing. See NLRB v.
Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
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tion and discussion to impasse. 212
Similarly, any charges of surface bargaining should be supported
by sufficient evidence. The decision to close raises relatively few issues
and the company and union will likely have opposite views. The
Board must take into account that there will be little room for compromise in these cases, and impose a substantial burden to prove bad-faith
bargaining if an employer does in fact negotiate before implementing a
2 13
closing decision.
Just as a company's negotiations are measured by the standard of
good faith, so too a union has the obligation of good faith to fulfill its
bargaining duty. 214 If a union violates section 8(b)(3), it can be held
liable to an employer for losses caused thereby. 215 In partial-closing
negotiations, an employer's two most significant considerations are
confidentiality and speed. With respect to the interest in maintaining
confidentiality, it should be remembered that an employee is an agent
of his employer, 216 and, as an agent, has a common-law duty not to
disclose or use nonpublic material gained in the course of employment
for his own profit or to the detriment of his employer. 21 7 At common
law an- employer could sue for improper disclosure of confidential
knowledge as a breach of the duty of loyalty owed by an agent to his
212. "The law is clear that an employer may, after bargaining with the union to a deadlock or
impasse on an issue, make 'unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within his preimpasse proposals."' R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 445 (quoting Taft Broadcasting Co., 163
N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967), enforced sub nom. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968)). See also Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 568
(1966); Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-65 (1964).
213. Rabin, supra note 27, at 832-34. The Board does not generally defer to management's
need for flexibility; instead, often it finds bargaining that takes place in partial-closing cases to be
insufficient. See First Nat'I Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 101 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1979),
enforced, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted,49 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1981) (No.
80-544); The Ohio Brake & Clutch Corp. 244 N.L.R.B. No. 5, 101 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1979); Walter
Pape, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 719 (1973).
214. The purpose behind the enactment of section 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1976), was to
promote "equality and responsibility in bargaining" by making the duty to bargain mutual. H.R.
REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1947). See note 7 supra.
215. See, e.g., NLRB v. ILGWU Local 17,451 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1971); Graphic Arts Union
Local 280 (James H. Barry Co.), 235 N.L.R.B. 1084 (1978), enforced, 596 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979);
United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 964, 181 N.L.R.B. 948 (1970), enforced, 447 F.2d 643 (2d Cir.
1971); Southern Cal. Pipe Trades, Dist. Council No. 16, 167 N.L.R.B. 1004 (1967), enforced, 449
F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1971).
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2, Comment d; § 220, Comment g (1957).
217. The agency relationship between an employer and an employee is a "fiduciary relation."
Id § 1. As fiduciary, the agent has a duty not to reveal or use confidential information. 4 A.
SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 505 (1967); W. SELL, AGENCY § 136 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957).
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principal. 218 Certainly a union, as the employees' collective bargaining
agent, can stand in no better stead than the workers it represents. The
only reason an employer ordinarily discloses material about a possible
closing to the union is the requirements of the NLRA. For a union to
reveal this information, which it has learned only because of the employer's duty to bargain, and which it knows is confidential, would be
the antithesis of good faith bargaining. Because the NLRA preempts
state law, there is no common-law action for disclosure of labor negotiations data.219 Therefore, to provide protection, the Board should find
220
that such conduct violates section 8(b)(3).
Likewise, a union bargaining over the decision to close a plant
must be sensitive to the needs of management when time is of the essence. To allow a union in such instances to delay discussions unreasonably would be an unfair burden on the employer. When it can be
proved that a union has unjustifiably prolonged negotiations over a
partial shutdown, the Board should find bad-faith bargaining in violation of section 8(b)(3). Moreover, the Board should hold the union responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its acts. 221 This would
ensure that unions recognize the legitimate interests of employers in a
partial-closing case, just as companies must respect the proper concerns
of its employees by bargaining over the closing decision. If management knew that the law would protect its needs by giving unions an
218. See, ag., Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952); Franke v. Wiltschek, 115
F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y.), a.f'd, 209 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1953); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch.
241, 244-45, 70 A.2d 5, 7-8 (1949).
219. Since the union's improper disclosure of bargaining data could violate the duty to bargain in good faith under section 8(b)(3) and would not be a purely internal union affair, the
NLRA would preempt state regulation of this activity. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959); Broomfield, PreemptiveFederalJurisdictionOver Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83
H v. L. REv. 552 (1970); Cox, Labor Law PreemptionRevisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972);
Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered- The Apparent Reaffrmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REv.
469 (1972).
220. In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979), the Supreme Court found that a
union could not be ordered to keep information concerning psychological aptitude testing of employees confidential. See note 135 supra. In that case, however, only the employer was charged
with an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5). The Court reasoned that because the union
was not a party to the proceeding under section 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976), it could not be
found to have violated a Board order. 440 U.S. at 315-16. This problem would not exist, of
course, if an employer named a union as a respondent in a section 8(b)(3) charge for improperly
disclosing confidential information about a partial closing. The possibility that such dissemination could violate a union's duty to bargain in good faith was specifically noted in Justice White's
dissenting opinion. 440 U.S. at 323 n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
221. As the Supreme Court recently stated, "The Union is responsible for the 'foreseeable
consequences' of its conduct." NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco Title
Ins. Co.), 100 S. Ct. 2372, 2377 n.9 (1980); NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 400
U.S. 297, 304-05 (1971); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 46 (1954).
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incentive to maintain secrecy and to act promptly when necessary,
companies undoubtedly would be more willing to negotiate over a decision to close part of a business enterprise. Thus the time is ripe for
the Supreme Court to determine that an employer's decision to eliminate a financially ailing part of his business, even for legitimate reasons, is subject to the duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5).
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the number of business shutdowns increases because of economic difficulties, the issue whether employers must negotiate with unions over a decision to close a plant assumes greater importance. The
present, confused state of the law on this question is unacceptable. 222
The Board and the majority of appellate courts differ on the policy
underlying the existence of a duty to bargain over a decision to close or
move part of a business. Moreover, the Board has inconsistently applied its own doctrine that an employer must bargain with a union over
a partial-closing decision. And as cases such as Brockway Motor
Trucks v. NLRB indicate, appellate courts are divided on this issue as
well.
If the concept of collective bargaining is to adhere to the principle
of industrial democracy that underlies the NLRA, companies should be
required to bargain in good faith over partial-closing decisions, even if
the motivation for the business termination is purely economic. Such a
policy may cause some interference with the movement of capital that
would not be present if management were allowed to decide unilaterally whether an operation should close. Negotiations are appropriate,
however, because both management and labor have vital interests at
stake in a partial closing. Moreover, the risk of a slight loss of economic efficiency is outweighed by the substantial gains that may occur
from the collective bargaining process if the parties are able to keep the
business intact. The salutary purpose of collective negotiations in reducing industrial strife requires that this option be given to employees
when their jobs are at stake.
222. On the court of appeals' remand of Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d

Cir. 1978), the Board was presented with an excellent opportunity to clarify its approach to the
duty of an employer to bargain over a partial closing. The Board noted that the Third
"declined to adopt what it regarded as the Board's per se rule requiring bargaining
partial closure is based on economic reasons." Brockway Motor Trucks, 251 N.L.R.B.
Lab. ReL Rep. 1515, 1516 (1980). Rather than explaining whether this was actually

Circuit had
whenever a
No. 23, 104
the Board's

position, the Board simply stated that it was "[a]ccepting the [Third Circuit's] analysis as the law
of the case." Id. The Board did not intimate whether it agreed with the Third Circuit's rationale.
Rather than elucidating the law in the area, the Board has thus only further confused its position.
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This article recommends the use of rebuttable presumptions concerning the existence and fulfillment of bargaining obligations to protect the legitimate concerns of management and employees in a partialclosing case. This would provide a rule that could be easily applied by
management, labor organizations, and employees, and would also allow flexibility so that the circumstances of each case could be examined
to determine the extent of the duty to bargain.
It is paramount that the NLRB and the courts of appeals adopt
uniform guidelines concerning when the duty to bargain exists in a partial-closing situation. Under the differing standards the Board and the
courts use today, it is impossible for counsel to advise companies, unions, or employees adequately about the duty to bargain. The Board
and the courts, as administrators of the labor laws, should provide a
reasonable set of rules concerning partial shutdowns under which all
parties can operate.

